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W
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I. INTRODUCTION 
 
 
     he development of cyber capabilities with the potential for operational use 
on the battlefield predates consideration as to how international law applies 
to this new form of warfare. Indeed, the first government assessment of cyber 
operations in armed conflict came in a 1999 analysis by the Office of the 
General Counsel at the U.S. Department of Defense, which warned, “[i]t will 
not be . . . easy to apply existing international law principles to information 
attack, a term used to describe the use of electronic means to gain access to 
or change information in a targeted information system without necessarily 
damaging its physical components.” 1 In particular, the assessment pointed to 
“computer network attack, or in today’s vernacular, the ‘hacking’ of another 
nation’s computer systems.”2 
By then, strategists and operators had been thinking about “information 
warfare” for some time, with many heralding a “revolution in military af-
fairs.”3 In 1998, the Joint Chiefs of Staff published Joint Doctrine for Information 
Operations, which began the complex process of developing a doctrinal 
framework for such operations.4 As military structures and operations inte-
grated cyber capabilities, the tendency was, and remains, “normalization,” 
where practitioners incorporate terms and doctrine from existing military 
parlance and practice into the cyber context.5 
                                                                                                                      
1. OFFICE OF THE GENERAL COUNSEL, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE, AN ASSESS-
MENT OF INTERNATIONAL LEGAL ISSUES IN INFORMATION OPERATIONS 5 (1999), http:// 
www.au.af.mil/au/awc/awcgate/dod-io-legal/dod-io-legal.pdf. 
2. Id. 
3. See, e.g., CYBERWAR 2.0: MYTHS, MYSTERIES AND REALITY (Alan Campen & Douglas 
Dearth eds., 1998); CYBER WAR: SECURITY, STRATEGY, AND CONFLICT IN THE INFOR-
MATION AGE (Alan Campen ed., 1996); MARTIN C. LIBICKI, WHAT IS INFORMATION WAR-
FARE? (1995); MARTIN C. LIBICKI, THE MESH AND THE NET: SPECULATIONS ON ARMED 
CONFLICT IN A TIME OF FREE SILICON (1994); WINN SCHWARTAU, INFORMATION WAR-
FARE: CHAOS ON THE ELECTRONIC SUPERHIGHWAY (1994); THE INFORMATION AGE: AN 
ANTHOLOGY ON ITS IMPACT AND CONSEQUENCES (David S. Alberts & Daniel S. Papp 
eds., 1977). 
4. The term was defined as “[o]perations to disrupt, deny, degrade, or destroy infor-
mation resident in computer and computer networks, or the computers and networks them-
selves.” Joint Chiefs of Staff, Joint Pub 3–13, Joint Doctrine for Information Operations, 
at GL–5 (1998). 
5. For example, U.S. military doctrine states, “Cyberspace attack actions are a form of 
fires, are taken as part of an OCO [offensive cyber operation] or DCO–RA [defensive cyber 
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The international legal community struggled, rather unsuccessfully, to 
maintain pace with both doctrinal development and technological advances. 
To lighten their load, most international lawyers also attempted to normalize 
their work, primarily through reasoning by analogy.6 In particular, they 
tended to directly apply terms, concepts, and applications already resident in 
international humanitarian law (IHL), much as their operational brethren 
were doing with respect to operational concepts. 
In most cases, this process generated acceptable results. However, cer-
tain concepts proved difficult to apply cleanly in the cyber context. For in-
stance, the meaning of the word “attack” in IHL’s conduct of hostilities rules 
remains unsettled when applied to cyber operations. Most significant in this 
regard is the prohibition on directing “attacks” against civilian objects that is 
found in Article 52(1) of Additional Protocol I to the 1949 Geneva Conven-
tions7 and relevant customary law,8 for unless a cyber operation qualifies as 
an attack (or the targeted cyber infrastructure enjoys special protection), it 
arguably may be directed against civilian cyber infrastructure.9 A related de-
bate revolves around whether data is an “object” in IHL, such that a cyber 
operation that intentionally alters or deletes civilian data is unlawful and 
                                                                                                                      
operation-response action] mission, are coordinated with other USG departments and agen-
cies, and are carefully synchronized with planned fires in the physical domain.” Joint Chiefs 
of Staff, Joint Publication 3–12, Cyberspace Operations, at II–7 (2018) [hereinafter Joint 
Chiefs of Staff, Cyberspace Operations]. The Department of Defense Dictionary of Military and 
Associated Terms defines fires as “The use of weapon systems or other actions to create spe-
cific lethal or nonlethal effects on a target.” DOD DICTIONARY OF MILITARY AND ASSOCI-
ATED TERMS 84 (As of June 2019), https:// www.jcs.mil/Portals/36/Documents/Doc-
trine/pubs/dictionary.pdf?ver=2019–04–25–095717–503. 
6. See, for example, the articles in 76 INTERNATIONAL LAW STUDIES (2002) resulting 
from the first major conference on the subject, Computer Network Attack and International 
Law, which was held at the U.S. Naval War College in 1999. 
7. Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, and Relating to 
the Protection of Victims of International Armed Conflicts art. 52(1), June 8, 1977, 1125 
U.N.T.S. 3 [hereinafter AP I]. 
8. 1 CUSTOMARY INTERNATIONAL HUMANITARIAN LAW r. 7, at 25–29 (Jean–Marie 
Henckaerts & Louise Doswald–Beck eds., 2005) [hereinafter CIHL]. 
9. See the discussion in Michael N. Schmitt, Rewired Warfare: Rethinking the Law of Cyber 
Attack, 96 INTERNATIONAL REVIEW OF THE RED CROSS 189 (2014); see also Michael N. 
Schmitt, Wired Warfare 3.0: Protecting the Civilian Population During Cyber Operations, 102 INTER-
NATIONAL REVIEW OF THE RED CROSS (forthcoming 2019) [hereinafter Schmitt, Wired 
Warfare 3.0]. 
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harm to civilian data in an otherwise lawful attack against a military objective 
would factor into proportionality and precautions in attack assessments.10 
Further complicating matters is the fact that beyond the international law 
community terms may be used colloquially, or even described in official pub-
lications in ways that deviate from their legal meaning. For instance, “cyber 
attack” is defined in U.S. military doctrine as “actions taken in cyberspace 
that create noticeable denial effects (i.e., degradation, disruption, or destruc-
tion) in cyberspace or manipulation that leads to denial that appears in a 
physical domain, and is considered a form of fires.”11 This definition is so 
broad that it would encompass some cyber operations that do not qualify as 
an “attack” as that term is defined by treaty in IHL—“an act of violence, 
whether in offence or defence.”12 Such disparities regularly generate confu-
sion in discussions between the lay and legal communities regarding the law 
governing cyber operations. 
This article examines three terms drawn from classic IHL—weapons, 
means, and methods of warfare—that are also being applied to cyber oper-
ations. The three terms are of particular significance with respect to the use 
of cyber capabilities during an armed conflict because they are integral to the 
various IHL prohibitions and obligations cataloged below. Whether those 
prohibitions and obligations apply depends on whether a cyber capability or 
cyber operation falls within the ambit of the term in question. 
Interestingly, there has been little analysis of the terms as applied to cyber 
operations, at least among legal academics. We are of the view, however, that 
the tendency to normalize through reasoning by analogy, coupled with a lack 
of understanding of cyber operations from a technical perspective, may in-
advertently have resulted in a flawed understanding of how the IHL govern-
ing weapons, means, and methods of warfare applies in the cyber context. 
To explain our concern, we begin by identifying those IHL rules with nor-
mative significance vis-à-vis weapons, means, and methods. We then assess 
the prevailing understandings as to the meaning of the terms when applied 
                                                                                                                      
10. See, e.g., Heather A. Harrison Dinniss, The Nature of Objects: Targeting Networks and the 
Challenge of Defining Cyber Military Objectives, 48 ISRAEL LAW REVIEW 39 (2015); Kubo Mačák, 
Military Objectives 2.0: The Case for Interpreting Computer Data as Objects under International Human-
itarian Law, 48 ISRAEL LAW REVIEW 55 (2015); Michael N. Schmitt, The Notion of ‘Objects’ 
During Cyber Operations: A Riposte in Defence of Interpretive Precision, 48 ISRAEL LAW REVIEW 81 
(2015); Schmitt, Wired Warfare 3.0, supra note 9. 
11. Joint Chiefs of Staff, Cyberspace Operations, supra note 5, at GL–4. 
12. AP I, supra note 7, art. 49(1). 
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to operations, including cyber operations, conducted during an armed con-
flict. Having laid this foundation, the core of the analysis follows, first with 
an examination of the defining characteristics of systems that scholars uni-
versally accept as weapons, means, and methods of warfare. Identifying a key 
commonality among these characteristics, we conclude that cyber capabili-
ties cannot logically be categorized as weapons or means of cyber warfare. 
However, we find that in some circumstances cyber operations may qualify 
as a method of warfare. Finally, we apply our findings to the previously iden-
tified legal requirements to assess the extent to which they govern cyber ca-
pabilities and operations. 
 
II. RELEVANT LAW 
 
The determination of whether a cyber capability or operation qualifies as a 
weapon, means, or method of warfare bears on several key obligations that 
States shoulder under treaty and customary international law. First, certain 
requirements exist to review weapons, means, or methods of warfare for 
compliance with IHL and other legal regimes. Whether the “weapon review” 
obligations attach vis-à-vis cyber capabilities and operations depends on 
their legal characterization. Second, during an “attack,” a term of art in IHL 
explained below, the attacking party is required to take precautions to mini-
mize harm to civilians and civilian objects that includes choosing among 
means and methods of warfare. Again, the application of this obligation is 
tied to whether cyber capabilities and operations are means or methods of 
warfare. Finally, classification as a weapon, means, or method implicates pro-
hibitions under the law of neutrality regarding the movement of munitions 
and supplies across the territory of neutral States.13 
 
A. Legal Reviews of Weapons, Means, and Methods 
 
It is a longstanding premise of international law that “[i]n any armed conflict, 
the right of the Parties to the conflict to choose methods or means of warfare 
is not unlimited.”14 A key tool for operationalizing this premise is the re-
                                                                                                                      
13. Convention No. V Respecting the Rights and Duties of Neutral Powers and Per-
sons in Case of War on Land art. 2, Oct. 18, 1907, 36 Stat. 2310, T.S. No. 540 [hereinafter 
1907 Hague Convention No. V]. 
14. AP I, supra note 7, art. 35(1); see also Regulations annexed to Convention No. II with 
Respect to the Laws and Customs of War on Land art. 22, July 29, 1899, 32 Stat. 1803, T.S. 
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quirement to review weapons or means (or methods for some States) of war-
fare for compliance with IHL and other international law norms. Never has 
that obligation loomed larger, for as one commentator has observed, “the 
duty to systematically review the legality of weapons is of particular im-
portance today in light of the rapid development of new weapons technolo-
gies, such as remote-controlled drones and increasingly autonomous robots, 
cyber capabilities, nanotechnology, and the militarization of space.”15 
In treaty law, the duty to conduct a legal review is set forth in Article 36 
of Additional Protocol I. That provision provides,  
 
[i]n the study, development, acquisition or adoption of a new weapon, 
means or method of warfare, a High Contracting Party is under an obliga-
tion to determine whether its employment would, in some or all circum-
stances, be prohibited by this Protocol or by any other rule of international 
law applicable to the High Contracting Party.16 
 
It is unclear to what extent, if at all, Article 36 reflects customary inter-
national law. The voluminous International Committee of the Red Cross 
(ICRC) study on customary IHL contains no such obligation.17 However, 
                                                                                                                      
No. 403 [hereinafter 1899 Hague Convention No. II Regulations]; Regulations annexed to 
Convention No. IV Respecting the Laws and Customs of War on Land art. 22, Oct. 18, 
1907, 36 Stat. 2227, T.S. No. 539 [hereinafter 1907 Hague Convention No. IV Regulations]; 
Convention on Prohibitions or Restrictions on the Use of Certain Conventional Weapons 
Which May Be Deemed to Be Excessively Injurious or to Have Indiscriminate Effects 
pmbl., Oct. 10, 1980, 1342 U.N.T.S. 137 [hereinafter Conventional Weapons Convention]; 
Convention on the Prohibition of the Use, Stockpiling, Production and Transfer of Anti–
Personnel Mines and on Their Destruction pmbl., Sept. 17, 1997, 2056 U.N.T.S. 211; Con-
vention on Cluster Munitions, pmbl., May 30, 2008, 2688 U.N.T.S. 39; Treaty on the Pro-
hibition of Nuclear Weapons pmbl., opened for signature Sept. 20, 2017 (adopted July 7, 2017, 
not yet in force), 52 INTERNATIONAL LEGAL MATERIALS 350 (2018). 
15. NILS MELZER, INTERNATIONAL HUMANITARIAN LAW: A COMPREHENSIVE IN-
TRODUCTION 299 (2016). For general guidance on the reviews, see INTERNATIONAL COM-
MITTEE OF THE RED CROSS, A GUIDE TO THE LEGAL REVIEW OF NEW WEAPONS, MEANS 
AND METHODS OF WARFARE (2006). 
16. AP I, supra note 7, art. 36. 
17. CIHL, supra note 8. It has been suggested that the obligation to conduct a legal 
review of new weapons may derive from the Martens Clause, which first appeared in the 
preamble to 1899 Hague Convention No. II and was subsequently reaffirmed in 1907 Hague 
Convention No. IV, as well as Additional Protocol I and Additional Protocol II. See 
MELZER, supra note 15, at 299; see also Convention No. II with Respect to the Laws and 
Customs of War on Land pmbl., July 29, 1899, 32 Stat. 1803, T.S. No. 403 [hereinafter 1899 
Hague Convention No. II]; Convention No. IV Respecting the Laws and Customs of War 
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the experts who prepared the 2013 HPCR Manual on International Law Appli-
cable to Air and Missile Warfare took the position that the requirement to con-
duct a legal review of weapons (which they classified as a category of means 
of warfare) before fielding them is customary in nature.18 However, they 
found there to be insufficient State practice to conclude that an analogous 
customary law obligation applies to methods of warfare or that the duty to 
conduct reviews attaches during the “study, development, acquisition or 
adoption” of the weapons.19 
As to cyber capabilities and operations, the International Group of Ex-
perts (IGE) that prepared Tallinn Manual 2.0 on the International Law Applicable 
to Cyber Operations came to similar conclusions. It drew upon both Article 1 
of the 1907 Hague Convention IV and Common Article 1 of the 1949 Ge-
neva Conventions to find a customary law requirement to “ensure that the 
cyber means of warfare that they acquire or use comply with the rules of the 
law of armed conflict that bind them.”20 The former requires Parties to issue 
instructions to its land forces that are consistent with “the laws and customs 
of war,”21 whereas the latter requires that the High Contracting Parties to the 
                                                                                                                      
on Land pmbl., Oct. 18, 1907, 36 Stat. 2227, T.S. No. 539 [hereinafter 1907 Hague Conven-
tion No. IV]; AP I, supra note 7, art. 1(2) (“In cases not covered by this Protocol or by other 
international agreements, civilians and combatants remain under the protection and author-
ity of the principles of international law derived from established custom, from the princi-
ples of humanity and from the dictates of public conscience.”); Protocol Additional to the 
Geneva Conventions of August 12, 1949, and Relating to the Protection of Victims of Non–
International Armed Conflicts pmbl., June 8, 1977, 1125 U.N.T.S. 609 [hereinafter AP II]. 
The International Court of Justice opined in its Nuclear Weapons advisory opinion that the 
Martens Clause reflects customary international law and that it “has proved to be an effec-
tive means of addressing the rapid evolution of military technology.” Legality of the Threat 
or Use of Nuclear Weapons, Advisory Opinion, 1996 I.C.J. Rep. 226, ¶ 78 (July 8). However, 
in our view, deriving a distinct obligation to review means and methods of warfare where 
no specific treaty obligation exists is questionable, even in light of the Martens Clause. 
18. PROGRAM ON HUMANITARIAN POLICY AND CONFLICT RESEARCH AT HARVARD 
UNIVERSITY, MANUAL ON INTERNATIONAL LAW APPLICABLE TO AIR AND MISSILE WAR-
FARE 84 (2013) [hereinafter AMW MANUAL]. 
19. Id. With regard to the customary nature of the weapon review obligation, the experts 
noted that the requirement to assess their legality prior to fielding was “longstanding,” point-
ing to Article 1 of 1899 Hague Convention No. II, which references Article 23(e) of its 
accompanying Regulations. Id. Likewise, they note the identically numbered provisions of 
1907 Hague Convention No. IV and its accompanying Regulations. Id. 
20. TALLINN MANUAL 2.0 ON THE INTERNATIONAL LAW APPLICABLE TO CYBER OP-
ERATIONS r. 110(a), at 464–67 (Michael N. Schmitt ed., 2017) [hereinafter TALLINN MAN-
UAL 2.0]. 
21. 1907 Hague Convention No. IV, supra note 17, art. 1. 
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four 1949 Geneva Conventions “respect and ensure respect” for the Con-
ventions.22 For the IGE, this necessarily meant that the legality of “cyber 
weapons” must be reviewed prior to acquisition or use. The group was di-
vided over whether the obligation stretches further in the direction of Article 
36, and specifically, whether it applies to cyber methods of warfare and 
whether the obligation attaches during the cyber weapon acquisition or de-
velopment phase.23 
It appears, then, that the contemporary prevailing view is that the cus-
tomary law legal review obligation applies to at least means of warfare and 
attaches before they are fielded.24 States Party to Additional Protocol I are 
obligated beyond these requirements by the terms of Article 36. Note that 
States not a Party to the Protocol may adopt policy requirements more de-
manding than customary law. 
Significant in this regard is the United States, especially considering its 
advanced cyber capabilities. The U.S. approach to weapon reviews is set 
forth in the Department of Defense (DoD) Law of War Manual.25 It requires 
a review of weapons or weapons systems before acquisition or procurement 
for compliance with IHL obligations, other international law obligations of 
the United States, and any applicable domestic law.26 Regulatory guidance 
issued by the DoD to the individual services implements this requirement.27 
                                                                                                                      
22. Geneva Convention (I) for the Amelioration of the Condition of the Wounded and 
Sick in Armed Forces in the Field art. 1, Aug. 12, 1949, 6 U.S.T. 3114, 75 U.N.T.S. 31; 
Geneva Convention (II) for the Amelioration of the Condition of the Wounded, Sick and 
Shipwrecked Members of Armed Forces at Sea art. 1, Aug. 12, 1949, 6 U.S.T. 3217, 75 
U.N.T.S. 85; Geneva Convention (III) Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War art. 1, 
Aug. 12, 1949, 6 U.S.T. 3316, 75 U.N.T.S. 135; Geneva Convention (IV) Relative to the 
Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War art. 1, Aug. 12, 1949, 6 U.S.T. 3516, 75 
U.N.T.S. 287. 
23. TALLINN MANUAL 2.0, supra note 20, at 465. 
24. But see Natalia Jevglevskaja, Weapons Review Obligation under Customary International 
Law, 94 INTERNATIONAL LAW STUDIES 186 (2018). 
25. OFFICE OF THE GENERAL COUNSEL, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE, LAW OF 
WAR MANUAL § 6.2 (rev. ed., Dec. 2016) [hereinafter DOD LAW OF WAR MANUAL]. 
26. Id. 
27. U.S. Department of Defense, Directive 5000.1, The Defense Acquisition System ¶ 
E1.1.15, at 7 (2018) 
The acquisition and procurement of DoD weapons and weapon systems shall be consistent 
with all applicable domestic law and treaties and international agreements . . . . An attorney 
authorized to conduct such legal reviews in the Department shall conduct the legal review 
of the intended acquisition of weapons or weapons systems. 
For service regulations, see Headquarters, Department of the Army, Army Regulation 
27-53, Review of Legality of Weapons Under International Law (1979) [hereinafter Army 
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In its manual, the DoD states that the policy extends to “weapons that 
employ cyber capabilities to ensure that they are not per se prohibited by the 
laws of war,” but cautions that “[n]ot all cyber capabilities . . . constitute a 
weapon or a weapon system.”28 To illustrate the requirement, the Law of War 
Manual cites a legal review during acquisition or procurement of a weapon 
employing cyber capabilities to ensure it is not indiscriminate. It then ob-
serves, “a destructive computer virus that was programmed to spread and 
destroy uncontrollably within civilian Internet systems would be prohibited 
as an inherently indiscriminate weapon.”29 
Note the use of the term “weapon,” which suggests that, for the DoD, 
a destructive cyber capability is a weapon, whereas a non-destructive or non-
injurious capability is not. Unfortunately, the Manual fails to describe the type 
of “destruction” conceived of in the provision.30 As a result, this distinction 
and the criteria driving it are far from apparent. Moreover, it must be em-
phasized that the legal review requirement reflected in the Manual is set forth 
as a matter of policy, not law. 
Of particular relevance to “cyber capabilities” is the U.S. Air Force’s 
2018 regulation, The Law of War. It requires the Air Force to “conduct[] legal 
reviews of all weapons, weapon systems and relevant cyber capabilities, ac-
quired or modified by the Air Force to ensure compliance with the law of 
war, domestic law, and international law at the earliest stage possible in de-
velopment (prior to procurement or acquisition).”31 Interestingly, the Air 
Force addresses weapons and cyber capabilities separately throughout the 
document, which further states, “[c]yber capabilities are neither weapons nor 
nonlethal weapons, as defined and stated in DoD Directive 3000.03E.”32 
                                                                                                                      
Regulation 27-53]; Secretary of the Navy, SECNAV Instruction 5000.2E, Department of 
the Navy Implementation and Operation of the Defense Acquisition System and the Joint 
Capabilities Integration and Development System (2011); Secretary of the Air Force, Air 
Force Instruction 51-401 (2018) [hereinafter Air Force Instruction 51-401]. 
28. DOD LAW OF WAR MANUAL, supra note 25, § 16.6. 
29. Id. 
30. Tallinn Manual 2.0 includes certain losses of functionality in the notion of damage. 
TALLINN MANUAL 2.0, supra note 20, at 417. 
31. Air Force Instruction 51-401, supra note 27, ¶ 5. 
32. Id., attachment 1. The Instruction provides, “An Air Force cyber capability requir-
ing a legal review prior to development or acquisition is any device, computer program or 
computer script, including any combination of software, firmware or hardware intended to 
deny, disrupt, degrade, destroy or manipulate adversarial target information, information 
systems, or networks.” Id. 
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Although the exact meaning of this comment is unclear, it raises the possi-
bility that, at least for the U.S. Air Force, cyber capabilities are not coexten-
sive with weapons and therefore would not necessarily be subject to the same 
legal requirements and limitations that apply to the latter. 
It is not our purpose to resolve the issue of the scope of the legal review 
requirement. Rather, our question is more fundamental. Given the nature of 
cyber capabilities and operations, do they legally qualify as a weapon, means, 
or method of warfare under IHL such that they are subject to review in the 
first place, whatever position a State might take on the scope issue? If so, 
and depending on the scope of the obligation, an assessment against numer-
ous prohibitions, the violation of which would render the capability or op-
eration unlawful in certain situations or even per se, is necessary. 
Although a detailed discussion of these prohibitions is beyond the scope 
of this article, a degree of context is useful. A long-standing IHL rule pro-
hibits the employment of “weapons, projectiles and material and methods 
of warfare of a nature to cause superfluous injury or unnecessary suffering.”33 
The prohibition traces its lineage to the 1868 St. Petersburg Declaration,34 
recurs in numerous early IHL treaties,35 and finds contemporary expression 
in Article 35(2) of Additional Protocol I. It is a prohibition that has unques-
tionably acquired customary status.36 Of more modern vintage is the prohi-
bition on methods or means of warfare that “are intended, or may be ex-
pected, to cause widespread, long-term and severe damage to the natural en-
vironment.” Found in Article 35(3) of Additional Protocol I,37 this rule is not 
accepted as customary by a number of key States, including the United 
States,38 although the ICRC considers it as such.39 Should cyber capabilities 
or operations qualify as a weapon, means, or method of warfare, they would 
                                                                                                                      
33. AP I, supra note 7, art. 35(2). 
34. Declaration Renouncing the Use, in Time of War, of Explosive Projectiles Under 
400 Grammes Weight, Nov. 29/Dec. 11, 1868, 138 Consol. T.S. 297, 18 MARTENS NOU-
VEAU RECUEIL (ser. 1) 474. 
35. See, e.g., 1899 Hague Convention No. II Regulations, supra note 14, art. 23(e); 1907 
Hague Convention No. IV Regulations, supra note 14, art. 23(e). 
36. CIHL, supra note 8, r. 70, at 237–44. 
37. AP I, supra note 7, art. 35(3). 
38. DOD LAW OF WAR MANUAL, supra note 25, § 6.10.3.1 (citing Mark Simonoff, Min-
ister Counselor, U.S. Mission to the United Nations, Remarks at the 70th U.N. General 
Assembly, Sixth Committee on the Report of the International Law Commission on the 
Work of its 67th Session (Nov. 11, 2015)); 2015 DIGEST OF UNITED STATES PRACTICE IN 
INTERNATIONAL LAW ch. 7, §D(2), at 287; United States, Statement on Ratification of the 
CCW, Accepting Protocols I & II, Mar. 24, 1995, 1861 U.N.T.S. 482, 483. 
39. CIHL, supra note 8, r. 45, at 151–58. 
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be subject to these prohibitions, which States would optimally identify dur-
ing the afore-mentioned legal review process. 
For cyber capabilities, the more likely obstacle is the prohibition on in-
discriminate weapons, a ban residing in both treaty and customary interna-
tional law. Weapons can be unlawful on this basis in two ways. First, a 
method or means of warfare is prohibited by Article 57(4)(b) of Additional 
Protocol I and customary law if it “cannot be directed at a specific military 
objective.”40 In other words, the system cannot be aimed at a military objec-
tive with sufficient confidence that it will strike the target. The classic exam-
ple is the German V-2 rocket of World War II, for its guidance system was 
so rudimentary that hitting a military objective was almost a matter of luck. 
Second, a method or means of warfare is unlawful under Article 57(4)(c) of 
Additional Protocol I and customary law if it generates uncontrollable effects 
that do not sufficiently discriminate between lawful military objectives and 
civilian objects or the civilian population.41 Here, an illustration would be an 
air-delivered persistent chemical, for its spread would be subject to wind cur-
rents and other meteorological phenomena, and thus place the civilian pop-
ulation at uncontrollable risk. 
These prohibitions must be distinguished from those that encompass the 
unlawful use of a lawful means or method of warfare. For instance, the most 
basic IHL prohibition is on the use of otherwise lawful weapons, means, or 
method of warfare to target civilians, civilian objects, and other protected 
persons and objects.42 Similarly, it would be unlawful to fail to aim them at a 
military objective.43 An example would be the dropping of bombs or firing 
of artillery into an area without regard for whether protected persons or ob-
jects will be harmed. We are not concerned here with these prohibitions, for 
they are dependent upon the consequences that manifest from the use of the 
cyber capability or operation rather than their qualification as a weapon, 
means, or method of warfare. 
 
B. The Requirement of Feasible Precautions in Choice of Means and Methods 
 
The second IHL rule potentially implicated by categorization as a weapon, 
means, or method is the Additional Protocol I, Article 57(2)(a)(ii) require-
ment that an attacker “[t]ake all feasible precautions in the choice of means 
                                                                                                                      
40. AP I, supra note 7, art. 51(4)(b); CIHL, supra note 8, r. 12, at 40–43. 
41. AP I, supra note 7, art. 51(4)(c); CIHL, supra note 8, r. 12, at 40–43. 
42. AP I, supra note 7, arts. 51(2), 52(1); CIHL, supra note 8, rr. 1, 7, at 3–8, 25–29. 
43. AP I, supra note 7, art. 51(4)(a); CIHL, supra note 8, rr. 11, 12(a), at 37–43. 
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and methods of attack with a view to avoiding, and in any event to minimiz-
ing, incidental loss of civilian life, injury to civilians and damage to civilian 
objects,”44 an obligation that is customary in nature.45 In other words, an 
attacker must consider the various alternatives for achieving a desired effect 
in the battlespace and select the one that results in the least collateral damage 
from among those yielding the same or similar effect. “Feasible” options are 
widely understood as referring to those measures that are “practicable or 
practically possible, taking into account all circumstances ruling at the time, 
including humanitarian and military considerations.”46 Textually, it is clear 
that the requirement to take this precaution only applies in situations causing 
the type of harm set forth in the rule itself and not, for example, inconven-
ience, irritation, or fear. All such situations qualify as “attacks” under IHL,47 
and therefore the reference to means or methods “of attack” as distinct from 
means or methods “of warfare” does not bear on the rule’s applicability. 
The DoD Law of War Manual illustrates the taking of feasible precautions 
to avoid civilian harm by citing “weaponeering (e.g., selecting appropriate 
weapons, aim points).”48 Although the Manual does not employ the terms 
means or methods, its reference to “appropriate weapons” implicates the 
requirement to select from among alternative means of warfare, whereas aim 
point selection implicates methods of warfare. Thus, it is apparent that, at 
least by the DoD interpretation, the requirement of choice includes weap-
ons, means, and methods. 
Cyber operations offer an alternative to a kinetic attack that can some-
times reduce the potential for injury to civilians or damage to civilian objects. 
However, because the rule only applies to means and methods of attack, 
                                                                                                                      
44. AP I, supra note 7, art. 57(2)(a)(ii). 
45. CIHL, supra note 8, r. 17, at 56–58; see also DOD LAW OF WAR MANUAL, supra note 
25, § 5.11. The Law of War Manual notes that the obligation is legal in character. Id. at 250 
n.336 (citing Exec. Order No. 13,732, 3 C.F.R. 13,732 (July 1, 2016)). 
46. Protocol on Prohibitions or Restrictions on the Use of Mines, Booby-Traps and 
Other Devices as Amended on 3 May 1996 art. 3(10), May 3, 1996, 2048 U.N.T.S. 93, 133; 
United Kingdom Statement made upon Ratification of Additional Protocols I and II ¶ (b) 
(July 2, 2002), reprinted in DOCUMENTS ON THE LAW OF WAR 510 (Adam Roberts & Richard 
Guelf eds., 3d ed. 2000); CIHL, supra note 8, at 54. 
47. For the definition of attack in IHL, see AP I, supra note 7 art. 49. On attacks in the 
cyber context, see TALLINN MANUAL 2.0, supra note 20, r. 92, at 415–20. Note that even if 
no qualifying damage occurs to the target of a cyber operation, any indirect or collateral 
damage resulting from the cyber operation will qualify it as an attack subject to the require-
ment to take precautions. Id. at 418–19. 
48. DOD LAW OF WAR MANUAL, supra note 25, § 5.11. 
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qualification of a cyber capability or operation as such is a condition prece-
dent to its application in the cyber context. Note that even if they fail to 
qualify, the Additional Protocol I requirement to take “constant care . . . to 
spare the civilian population”49 would compel States Party to use an available 
cyber option if doing so minimizes harm to civilians and civilian objects, 
does not require the sacrifice of military advantage, and turning to that op-
tion is feasible in the circumstances. Even though these obligations overlap 
in practice, a party to the conflict will not be in breach of its obligation to 
choose among means and methods of warfare to avoid civilian harm unless 
the cyber capability or operation qualifies as a means or method; otherwise, 
its use will only violate the broader constant care requirement. 
 
C. The Prohibition on Movement of Munitions across Neutral Territory 
 
The third area of law potentially implicated by categorization as a weapon, 
means, or method is the law of neutrality. This body of law serves to balance 
the interests of belligerents in effectively prosecuting an armed conflict with 
those of States that are not a party to the conflict in minimizing the conflict’s 
impact upon their real and legal persons, their activities, and their territory. 
In doing so, it imposes corresponding rights and obligations on both bellig-
erents and neutrals. For instance, it prohibits belligerents from using neutral 
territory as a base of operations against their adversary, thereby respecting 
the right of neutrals to exclusive control over their territory, as well as the 
right to be free from the effects of hostilities.50 Neutral States have an obli-
gation to put an end to any activities related to the conflict (belligerent rights) 
occurring on their territory.51 Should a neutral State fail to comply with this 
duty, the aggrieved party to the conflict may take action to do so itself.52 
                                                                                                                      
49. AP I, supra note 7, art. 57(1); CIHL, supra note 8, r. 15, at 51–55. On the nature of 
the obligation, see Michael N. Schmitt & Michael Schauss, Uncertainty in the Law of Targeting: 
Towards a Cognitive Framework, 10 HARVARD NATIONAL SECURITY JOURNAL 148, 178–80 
(2019). 
50. 1907 Hague Convention No. V, supra note 13, art. 1; Convention No. XIII Con-
cerning the Rights and Duties of Neutral Powers in Naval War arts. 1–2, Oct. 18, 1907, 36 
Stat. 2415, T.S. No. 545 [hereinafter 1907 Hague Convention No. XIII]; see also DOD LAW 
OF WAR MANUAL, supra note 25, § 15.5. 
51. 1907 Hague Convention No. V, supra note 13, art. 5; TALLINN MANUAL 2.0, supra 
note 20, r. 152, at 558–60; see also DOD LAW OF WAR MANUAL, supra note 25, § 15.5. 
52. See DOD LAW OF WAR MANUAL, supra note 25, ¶ 15.4.2; UNITED KINGDOM MIN-
ISTRY OF DEFENCE, THE MANUAL OF THE LAW OF ARMED CONFLICT ¶ 1.43(a) (2004) 
[hereinafter UK LOAC MANUAL]; TALLINN MANUAL 2.0, supra note 20, r. 153, at 560–61. 
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In treaty law, the rules of neutrality are set forth in the 1907 Hague (V) 
Convention for land conflict and the 1907 Hague (XIII) Convention for 
maritime warfare.53 They are generally considered reflective of customary in-
ternational law.54 In the context of qualification as a weapon, means, or 
method of warfare, the relevant provision of the former is Article 2, by which 
“[b]elligerents are forbidden to move troops or convoys of either munitions 
of war or supplies across the territory of a neutral Power.”55 Because, as ex-
plained below, the term “munitions” logically includes the terms “weapons” 
and “means” in the contemporary context, the question is whether this pro-
hibition extends to the transmission of cyber capabilities through the cyber 
infrastructure of a neutral country.56 
The fact that there is no analogous position in Hague Convention XIII 
should not be interpreted as suggesting that there is no maritime context to 
the prohibition. Assuming solely for the sake of analysis that Article 2 en-
compasses the transmission of malware across neutral territory, there is no 
reason to exclude its applicability to submarine communication cables pass-
ing through the territorial sea of a neutral coastal State for use in land war-
fare. Nor should it be presumed that the prohibition applies only to the 
transit of weapons for use in land combat merely because Hague Convention 
V is limited to that domain. The customary law analog to Article 2 is best 
interpreted as prohibiting the transit of weapons across neutral territory ir-
respective of domain. This understanding is consistent with the object and 
purpose of the prohibition, especially since air warfare did not exist at the 
time, and maritime weapons would typically have been transported by sea 
outside the territorial sea of coastal states, which then extended only three 
                                                                                                                      
53. 1907 Hague Convention No. V, supra note 13; 1907 Hague Convention No. XIII, 
supra note 50. 
54. Eric Jensen, Sovereignty and Neutrality in Cyber Conflict, 35 FORDHAM INTERNATIONAL 
LAW JOURNAL 816, 819–20 (2012). 
55. 1907 Hague Convention No. V, supra note 13, art. 2; see also DOD LAW OF WAR 
MANUAL, supra note 25, § 15.5. 
56. On the law of neutrality in the cyber context, see Wolff Heintschel von Heinegg, 
Territorial Sovereignty and Neutrality in Cyberspace, 89 INTERNATIONAL LAW STUDIES 123 
(2013); Allison Gaul, Neutrality in the Digital Battle Space: Applications of the Principle of Neutrality 
in Information Warfare, 29 SYRACUSE SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY LAW REPORTER 51 (2013); 
Jensen, supra note 54; Wolff Heintschel von Heinegg, Neutrality in Cyberspace, in 4TH INTER-
NATIONAL CONFERENCE ON CYBER CONFLICT 35 (Christian Czosseck, Rain Ottis & 
Katherina Ziolkowski eds., 2012). 
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nautical miles seaward.57 This narrows the issue to whether States may trans-
mit malware through cyber infrastructure located in the maritime or land 
territory of a neutral State. 
The DoD raised “[t]he issue of the legality of transporting cyber ‘weap-
ons’ across the Internet through the infrastructure owned and/or located in 
neutral third countries without obtaining the equivalent of ‘overflight rights’” 
in its 2011 Defense Cyberspace Policy Report to Congress.58 It accepted the 
applicability of the prohibition, noting that “[t]he law of armed conflict and 
customary international law, however, provide a strong basis to apply such 
norms to cyberspace governing responsible state behavior” and “the devel-
opment of norms for state conduct does not require a reinvention of cus-
tomary international law nor render existing norms obsolete.” 59 The DoD 
acknowledged that “[t]he interconnected nature of cyberspace poses signifi-
cant challenges for applying some of the legal frameworks developed for 
specific physical domains” and observed that “[t]here is currently no inter-
national consensus regarding the definition of a “cyber weapon.”60 Thus, it 
concluded, “DoD, in conjunction with other U.S. Government departments 
and agencies, will continue to work with our partners and Allies to build 
consensus on the applicability of norms in cyberspace to develop customary 
international law further.”61 Although leaving open the question of the legal-
ity of transmitting cyber capabilities across neutral territory, the report accu-
rately identified the problems: determining whether cyber capabilities are 
weapons and, if so, the applicability of the prohibition thereto. 
There are two camps, both of which were represented within the Tallinn 
Manual 2.0 IGE. By the first view, embraced by a majority of the experts, 
Article 2 prohibits the transmission of “cyber weapons” through neutral ter-
ritory. As explained below, all of the experts characterized malware as a 
weapon, and thus those experts in the majority reasoned that the prohibition 
necessarily applies to malware, whether carried intact (for example, on a 
memory stick) or transmitted in a communication across neutral cyber infra-
structure. 
                                                                                                                      
57. 2 UNITED NATIONS CONVENTION ON THE LAW OF THE SEA 1982: A COMMEN-
TARY ¶ 3.2, at 77 (Satya N. Nandan & Shabtai Rosenne eds., 1993). 
58. U.S. DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE, DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE CYBERSPACE POL-
ICY REPORT 8 (2011). 
59. Id. at 8–9 (citing WHITE HOUSE, INTERNATIONAL STRATEGY FOR CYBERSPACE: 
PROSPERITY, SECURITY, AND OPENNESS IN A NETWORKED WORLD (2011)). 
60. Id. at 8. 
61. Id. at 9. 
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These experts noted that malware is typically broken into packets upon 
transmission, such that the cyber weapons are not intact when transmitted. 
Indeed, only a portion of packets might cross neutral territory on their way 
to reassembly at the targeted infrastructure. For proponents of the approach, 
this technical reality posed no obstacle to the application of Article 2. They 
pointed out that the prohibition would unquestionably apply to the transport 
of individual components of a weapon across neutral territory and could 
identify no reason to treat “components” (packets of data) of a cyber weapon 
differently. 
Should Article 2 apply to cyber capabilities, the neutral State would bear 
a corresponding obligation to put an end to their transit across its territory. 
Of course, this obligation would be conditioned on that State having con-
structive or actual knowledge of the transmission and possessing feasible 
means to terminate it.62 If the State were either unwilling or unable to termi-
nate the wrongful transmission of the malware through its cyber infrastruc-
ture, the aggrieved belligerent would have the right to take those actions nec-
essary to terminate it, including through the use of force.63 
Concerned that this interpretation of neutrality law would effectively 
prohibit many military cyber operations that States would be likely to deem 
necessary and therefore inappropriately skew the balance between neutral 
and belligerent rights and obligations, a minority of the Tallinn Manual 2.0 
IGE adopted a different understanding of the law. These experts pointed to 
Article 8 of Hague Convention V, which states, “A neutral Power is not 
called upon to forbid or restrict the use on behalf of the belligerents of tele-
graph or telephone cables or of wireless telegraphy apparatus belonging to it 
or to companies or private individuals.”64 Note that the provision is not lim-
ited to belligerent communications lacking military value. They reasoned, 
therefore, that malware is best analogized to a communication (Article 8) 
rather than a tangible weapon (Article 2). It might be a communication of 
great military value, but Article 8 provides a specific exception for all bellig-
erent communications. 
In our estimation, the latter approach is a better fit to the reality of cyber 
hostilities. An attacker may not have full control over the path taken by the 
malware packets to the intended target, and in most circumstances, the neu-
tral State is unlikely to effectively identify those packets passing through its 
                                                                                                                      
62. TALLINN MANUAL 2.0, supra note 20, at 559. 
63. Id. 
64. 1907 Hague Convention No. V, supra note 13, art. 8; see also DOD LAW OF WAR 
MANUAL, supra note 25, § 16.4.1; TALLINN MANUAL 2.0, supra note 20, at 558–59. 
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cyber infrastructure, at least in the current state of the technology. This un-
derstanding comports with the premise that an interpretation of law logically 
should allow for its enforcement. The 2016 U.S. Law of War Manual endorsed 
this approach, thereby resolving the question DoD had raised in its 2011 
Cyberspace Policy Report. 65 
It must be cautioned, however, that the aforementioned rights and obli-
gations, whatever their scope, depend on qualification of the cyber capability 
transmitted across neutral territory as a weapon or means of warfare. As will 
become apparent, that qualification is not a foregone conclusion. 
 
III. DEFINITIONS OF WEAPONS, MEANS, AND METHODS 
 
Given that the involvement of a weapon, means, or method is the sine qua 
non element in the rules above, one might expect the terms to be well defined 
in international law. This is far from the case. Despite persistent claims that 
determination of what constitutes a weapon, means, or method is a “rela-
tively straightforward process,”66 divergent views and approaches exist. 
These differences are examined below in an attempt to distill the key criteria 
for qualification as one of the categories in the contexts set out above. 
 
A. Treaty Definitions 
 
As noted, references to weapons, means, and methods appear in Article 35 
and Article 36 of Additional Protocol I. However, the drafters were some-
what inconsistent, for Article 35 refers to “methods or means of warfare,” 
as well as “weapons, projectiles and material and methods of warfare,”67  
while Article 36 uses the phrase “weapon, means or method of warfare.”68 
In any event, the treaty defines none of these terms. Nor are the travaux 
préparatoires on the provisions of much help. They note that “[n]o effort was 
made . . . to define either term, and the choice of words should, perhaps, be 
considered further by a drafting committee.”69 Instead, the delegates to the 
                                                                                                                      
65. DOD LAW OF WAR MANUAL, supra note 25, § 16.4.1. 
66. Justin McClelland, The Review of Weapons in Accordance with Article 36 of Additional 
Protocol I, 85 INTERNATIONAL REVIEW OF THE RED CROSS 397, 404 (2003). 
67. AP I, supra note 7, art. 35.  
68. Id. art. 36. 
69. 15 OFFICIAL RECORDS OF THE DIPLOMATIC CONFERENCE ON THE REAFFIRMA-
TION AND DEVELOPMENT OF INTERNATIONAL HUMANITARIAN LAW APPLICABLE IN 
ARMED CONFLICTS, GENEVA (1974–1979), at 369 (1978) [hereinafter OFFICIAL REC-
ORDS]. 
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Conference discussed whether to include the word “methods” in the treaty 
articles, for they realized doing so “would make an important change in the 
law and that this should not be done without further careful consideration.”70 
Although this finding supports the proposition that the customary law re-
quirement for legal reviews does not extend to methods of warfare, it has no 
bearing on the question at hand—the meaning of the terms. 
Article 2 of Hague Convention V does not use the terms weapons or 
means, but rather the phrase “munitions of war” and the term “supplies.”71 
Both are undefined. Article 7, which deals with export and transportation by 
a neutral State, distinguishes arms from munitions of war, suggesting that 
munitions is a narrower concept that refers to the destructive aspect as dis-
tinct from the entity that launched it. However, the reference to supplies 
would render the distinction meaningless in terms of the substantive prohi-
bition, as supplies would self-evidently encompass arms. This interpretation 
is supported by Article 14, which provides that neutral powers may permit 
the passage of the sick and wounded over their territory “on the condition 
that the trains carrying them shall carry neither personnel nor war material.”72 
Again, the reference to war materials suggests a broad interpretation of the 
prohibition.73 But, as with Additional Protocol I, Hague Convention V offers 
no assistance towards identifying any particular characteristics of the term 
munitions, a problem that did not arise in 1907 when the plain meaning of 
the term “arms” would include, for instance, rifles and artillery, whereas mu-
nitions would encompass, relatedly, bullets artillery shells. 
No other treaties, including the Conventional Weapons Convention,74 
provide guidance on the meaning of the terms at hand. Therefore, it is useful 
to consider how States have interpreted them in practice, especially with re-
spect to the guidance that they give to their armed forces. 
 
B. State Definitions 
 
State definitions of weapons, means, and methods, found primarily in mili-
tary manuals, offer some help in understanding use of the terms. In its dis-
cussion of weapon reviews, the U.S. Navy, U.S. Marine Corps, and U.S. 
                                                                                                                      
70. Id. 
71. 1907 Hague Convention No. V, supra note 13, art. 7. 
72. Id. art. 14.  
73. A. PEARCE HIGGINS, THE HAGUE PEACE CONFERENCE AND OTHER INTERNA-
TIONAL CONFERENCES CONCERNING THE LAWS AND USAGES OF WAR 291 (1909). 
74. Conventional Weapons Convention, supra note 14. 
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Coast Guard’s Commander’s Handbook on the Law of Naval Operations defines 
“weapons and weapons systems” to which it extends the requirement of a 
review, as “all arms, munitions, materiel, instruments, mechanisms, devices, 
and those components required for their operation, that are intended to have 
an effect of injuring, damaging, destroying, or disabling personnel or prop-
erty, to include nonlethal weapons.”75 In the same context, the U.S. Air Force 
explains that a weapon is a “device designed to kill, injure, disable or tempo-
rarily incapacitate people or destroy, damage, disable or temporarily incapac-
itate property or materiel.”76 The U.S. Army similarly includes “[c]hemical 
weapons and all conventional arms, munitions, materiel, instruments, mech-
anisms, or devices which have an intended effect of injuring, destroying, or 
disabling enemy personnel, materiel, or property”77 within the ambit of its 
weapon review requirement. As to the prohibition of transport across neu-
tral territory, the Commander’s Handbook does not use the words “munitions” 
or “weapons,” opting instead for “troops or war materials and supplies.”78 
Interestingly, the DoD’s Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms includes no 
entry for weapon, means of warfare, or method of warfare.79 While the latter 
two terms are legal terms of art, the inclusion of which might not be ex-
pected, the absence of a definition of weapon is noteworthy. 
Among other States, Australia had previously defined weapons as “an 
offensive or defensive instrument of combat used to destroy, injure, defeat 
or threaten. It includes weapon systems, munitions, sub-munitions, ammu-
nition, targeting devices, and other damaging or injuring mechanisms.”80 The 
explanation notes that a “computer expressly designed as a new weapon to 
offensively target enemy computer systems for destruction is covered.”81 
The Australian Defence Force replaced the instruction containing the 
above definition with interim guidance that refers to its Defence Legal Review 
                                                                                                                      
75. U.S. NAVY, U.S. MARINE CORPS & U.S. COAST GUARD, NWP 1-14M/MCTP 11-
10B/COMDTPUB P5800.7A, THE COMMANDER’S HANDBOOK ON THE LAW OF NAVAL 
OPERATIONS § 9.1 (2017) [hereinafter THE COMMANDER’S HANDBOOK]. 
76. Air Force Instruction 51-401, supra note 27, ch. 1. 
77. Army Regulation 27-53, supra note 27, ¶ 3(a). 
78. THE COMMANDER’S HANDBOOK, supra note 75, § 7.3.1. 
79. DOD DICTIONARY OF MILITARY AND ASSOCIATED TERMS, supra note 5. 
80. Department of Defence, DI(G) OPS 44-1, Legal Review of New Weapons ¶ 3 
(2005) (Austl.) [hereinafter Legal Review of New Weapons]. 
81. Id. ¶ 3 n.2. 
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of New Weapons Guide.82 The Guide provides the following definitions, which 
are of particular significance because Australia is a Party to Additional Pro-
tocol I, and therefore the definitions represent that State’s understanding of 
the meaning of the terms in Article 36. It defines weapon as, “[a] device, 
whether tangible or intangible, designed or intended to be used in warfare to 
cause: a. injury to, or death of, persons; or b. damage to, or destruction of, 
objects,” and means of warfare as “[w]eapons or weapon systems.”83 Finally, 
it defines methods of warfare as “[t]he way or manner in which weapons and 
weapon systems are to be used.”84 
Denmark provides a definition similar to that of the United States, ex-
plaining that the term weapons refers to “inter alia, conventional weapons, 
chemical, biological, and bacteriological weapons, ammunition, weapons sys-
tems, delivery systems, platforms, and instruments designed to kill, destroy, 
injure, or in any other way incapacitate or render hors de combat personnel and 
equipment.”85 Notably, Denmark added incapacitation as an effect that qual-
ifies an instrument as a weapon. However, it is unclear if the notion of inca-
pacitation applies only to people or to equipment as well. 
Canada merely discusses incendiaries, booby-traps, land mines, nuclear 
weapons, rockets, missiles, bombs, and torpedoes in its section on lawful 
weapons.86 As to unlawful weapons, Canada includes poison, non-detectable 
fragments, environment altering weapons, gas, biological and chemical 
weapons, riot control agents, and blinding lasers.87 Similarly, the United 
Kingdom does not define weapons, but rather provides an illustrative list 
that includes biological weapons, bayonets, swords, booby-traps, chemical 
weapons, dum-dum bullets, explosive bullets, fragmentation, incendiaries, 
landmines, lasers, nuclear weapons, non-lethal weapons, and poison.88 There 
is no suggestion that the list is exhaustive. 
                                                                                                                      
82. Department of Defence, Interim Defence Instruction, DI Admin 44-1, Legal Re-
view of New Weapons ¶ 3 (2018) (Austl.) (referring to Directorate of Operations and Secu-
rity Law, Defence Legal Division, Australian Defence Force, Defence Legal Review of New 
Weapons Guide (n.d.)). 
83. Directorate of Operations and Security Law, Defence Legal Division, Australian 
Defence Force, Defence Legal Review of New Weapons Guide 1 (n.d.). 
84. Id. 
85. DANISH MINISTRY OF DEFENCE, MILITARY MANUAL ON INTERNATIONAL LAW 
RELEVANT TO DANISH ARMED FORCES IN INTERNATIONAL OPERATIONS 336 (2016). 
86. CHIEF OF THE GENERAL STAFF (CANADA), LAW OF ARMED CONFLICT AT THE 
OPERATIONAL AND TACTICAL LEVELS, B-GJ-005-104/FP021, ¶¶ 520–29 (2001). 
87. Id. ¶¶ 508–19. 
88. UK LOAC MANUAL, supra note 52, ch. 6. 
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Interesting, the United Kingdom has recently followed the U.S. Air 
Force example by using the term “cyber capabilities” instead of cyber 
weapon. In its 2018 Ministry of Defence doctrine publication Cyber and Elec-
tromagnetic Activities, there is only one mention of cyber weapons.89 All other 
associated references are to cyber capabilities. The UK Concepts and Doc-
trine Centre likewise refers to cyber capabilities in its Cyber Primer.90 
 
C. Unofficial Definitions 
 
Unofficial treatment of the terms weapons, means of warfare and methods 
of warfare tend to mirror those proffered by States. The ICRC Commentary 
on the Additional Protocols distinguishes means and methods but does not ad-
dress weapons separately. The commentary to Article 35, which addresses 
superfluous injury or unnecessary suffering, as well as the environment, pro-
vides, “[t]he words ‘methods and means’ include weapons in the widest 
sense, as well as the way in which they are used. The use that is made of a 
weapon can be unlawful in itself, or it can be unlawful only under certain 
conditions.”91 The commentary to Article 36, which contains the weapons 
review provision, provides no explanation of the terms “weapon, means or 
methods of warfare,” although the text is framed primarily in terms of 
“weapons” and their “normal use.”92 
Similarly, the Article 57 commentary focuses on “weapons,” despite re-
quiring a choice among means and methods.93 Finally, when discussing Ar-
ticle 51(4)(b) and Article 51(4)(c), which prohibit an attack that is indiscrim-
inate either because the means or methods used cannot be directed or their 
effects are uncontrollable, the Commentary provides, “[t]he term ‘means of 
combat’ or ‘means of warfare’ . . . generally refers to the weapons being used, 
while the expression ‘methods of combat’ generally refers to the way in 
                                                                                                                      
89. DEVELOPMENT, CONCEPTS AND DOCTRINE CENTRE, UNITED KINGDOM MINIS-
TRY OF DEFENCE, JDN 1/18, CYBER AND ELECTROMAGNETIC ACTIVITIES 35 (2018). 
90. DEVELOPMENT, CONCEPTS AND DOCTRINE CENTRE, UNITED KINGDOM MINIS-
TRY OF DEFENCE, CYBER PRIMER 5 (2d ed. 2016) (“Defence cyber capabilities can be a 
combination of hardware, firmware, software and operator action.”). 
91. COMMENTARY ON THE ADDITIONAL PROTOCOLS OF 8 JUNE 1977 TO THE GE-
NEVA CONVENTIONS OF 12 AUGUST 1949, ¶ 1402 (Yves Sandoz, Christophe Swinarski & 
Bruno Zimmermann eds., 1987) [COMMENTARY ON THE ADDITIONAL PROTOCOLS]. 
92. See id. ¶¶ 1463–82. 
93. Id. ¶¶ 2200–02. 
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which such weapons are used.”94 Throughout the Commentary, it is clear that 
the term “means” includes “weapons.” 
Importantly, although the ICRC Commentary tends to speak of methods 
as the manner in which weapons are employed, the term is clearly broader. 
This is apparent in the Additional Protocol I Article 54 and customary law 
prohibition on using starvation as a method of warfare.95 The commentary 
to Article 54 explains, “[s]tarvation is referred to here as a method of warfare, 
i.e., a weapon to annihilate or weaken the population.”96 Despite the term 
“weapon,” the better interpretation of the provision is that annihilation or 
weakening of the civilian population by deprivation of food and other essen-
tials refers to a method that does not depend on the use of a weapon. The 
significance of the point that methods of warfare do not require the use of a 
weapon is discussed below. 
In 2013, the Geneva Academy of International Humanitarian Law and 
Human Rights launched its Weapons Law Encyclopedia, an online compilation 
of information on the regulation of weapons under public international law. 
Echoing the prevailing understanding, the Encyclopedia observes that while 
“[t]here is no definition of a weapon under international law,”97 a working 
definition is that a  
 
weapon is a device that is constructed, adapted, or used to kill, injure, dis-
orient, or threaten a person or to inflict damage on a physical object. A 
weapon may act through kinetic energy or by other means, such as trans-
mission of electricity, diffusion of chemical substances or biological agents 
or sound, or direction of electromagnetic energy.98 
 
 The Encyclopedia suggests, “[t]he term ‘means of warfare’ generally de-
scribes the weapons being used by parties to an armed conflict in the conduct 
of hostilities.”99 By contrast, it suggests methods of warfare “generally de-
scribes the way in which weapons are used by parties to an armed conflict in 
                                                                                                                      
94. Id. ¶ 1957. 
95. AP I, supra note 7,  art. 54(1); AP II, supra note 17, art. 14. On starvation and cyber 
operations, see TALLINN MANUAL 2.0, supra note 20, r. 107, at 459–60. 
96. COMMENTARY ON THE ADDITIONAL PROTOCOLS, supra note 91, ¶ 2090. 
97. GENEVA ACADEMY OF INTERNATIONAL HUMANITARIAN LAW AND HUMAN 
RIGHTS, WEAPONS LAW ENCYCLOPEDIA, www.weaponslaw.org/glossary/weapon (last vis-
ited July 1, 2019) [hereinafter WEAPONS LAW ENCYCLOPEDIA]. 
98. Id. 
99. Id., Glossary, “means of warfare.” 
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the conduct of hostilities.”100 The latter definition is overly restrictive, as it 
excludes methods, such as starvation, not requiring the use of weapons. 
Another important collaborative project in the field of international hu-
manitarian law, the Manual on International Law Applicable to Air and Missile 
Warfare (AMW Manual),101 sets out its own set of definitions. According to 
the AMW Manual, a weapon is  
 
a means of warfare used in combat operations, including a gun, missile, 
bomb or other munitions, that is capable of causing either (i) injury to, or 
death of, persons; or (ii) damage to, or destruction of, objects.”102 Means 
of warfare is broader, for it also encompasses the platforms and equipment 
which make possible an attack.103 
 
An additional note of consequence is that the Manual describes muni-
tions as being “a narrower concept than ‘weapon’ and refers to the object 
that causes the injury, death, damage or destruction.”104 Thus, the Manual 
explains, some weapons are also munitions, such as bombs delivered from 
an aircraft.105 If a munition requires an object to deliver the force necessary 
for delivery, such as a gun or artillery, then that component constitutes a 
weapon, but not the munition itself.106 By contrast, “methods of warfare 
consist of the various general categories of operations, such as bombing, as 
well as the special tactics used for an attack, such as high altitude bomb-
ing.”107 They are not limited to the manner in which weapons, or other means 
of warfare, are employed. 
Tallinn Manual 2.0 also addresses the terms. It explains that a weapon is 
“generally understood as that aspect of the system used to cause damage or 
destruction to objects or injury or death to persons,” and characterizes both 
weapons and weapon systems as means of warfare.108 For the Tallinn 2.0 
experts, a “cyber means of warfare” encompasses “cyber weapons and their 
                                                                                                                      
100. Id., Glossary, “method of warfare.” 
101. AMW MANUAL, supra note 18. 
102. Id. r. 1(ff), at 49–50. 
103. Id. r. 1(t), at 31–32. 
104. Id. r. 1(ff), at 49–50. 
105. Id. r. 1(ff), cmt. ¶ 4, at 50. 
106. Id. 
107. Id. r. 1(v), at 34–35. 
108. TALLINN MANUAL 2.0, supra note 20, at 452. 
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associated cyber systems,”109 including “any cyber device, material, instru-
ment, mechanism, equipment, or software used, designed, or intended to be 
used to conduct a cyber attack.”110 Methods of cyber warfare are “the cyber 
tactics, techniques, and procedures by which hostilities are conducted.”111 
The term “refers to how cyber operations are mounted, as distinct from the 
means used to mount them.”112 
 
IV. TOWARDS AN UNDERSTANDING OF THE TERMS 
 
The imprecision and overlapping nature of the various explications of mu-
nitions, weapons, weapon systems, means, and methods set forth above ren-
der conclusive definitions of these terms elusive. Nevertheless, from the sur-
vey of the various treaties, commentaries, travaux préparatoires, State defini-
tions and lists, and unofficial manuals, a taxonomy enabling the application 
of legal prohibitions and requirements to cyber capabilities and cyber oper-
ations emerges. 
To begin, the interpretive situation is not as complex as it might initially 
appear, for the various terms can be divided into two broad categories. On 
the one hand, there are munitions, projectiles, weapons, weapons systems, 
and means of warfare. On the other hand, there are methods of warfare. This 
binary approach corresponds to that found in the ICRC Commentary.113 
It is unlikely that the relevant treaties contemplated a distinction between 
the terms in the first category. Article 36 and Article 57 of Additional Proto-
col I, as well as Article 2 of Hague Convention V, were self-evidently meant 
to be read expansively, with the same legal prohibitions and obligations at-
taching to each of the terms. Secondary sources usefully attempt to establish 
logical delineations thereof. The various manuals, in particular, approach the 
issue by treating terms such as munitions and projectiles as a subcategory of 
weapons, which are themselves either equivalent to, or a subcategory of, 
means of warfare.114 Doing so is logical and appropriate. 
Weapon systems comprise military equipment that, while not weapons 
themselves, have functions that are integral to the operations of a weapon, 
                                                                                                                      
109. Id. r. 103(a), at 452–53. 
110. Id. at 452. 
111. Id. r. 103(b), at 452–53. 
112. Id. at 453. 
113. COMMENTARY ON THE ADDITIONAL PROTOCOLS, supra note 91, ¶ 1957. 
114. AMW MANUAL, supra note 18, r. 1(ff), at 49–50; TALLINN MANUAL 2.0, supra note 
20, at 452–53. 
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such as a radar that guides a weapon to the target or a missile transporter, 
erector, or launcher. They are systems specifically designed for effectuating 
an attack using the weapon in question. That being so, it would be logically 
impossible to have a weapon system that was not designed to employ a 
weapon. Weapon systems qualify as a means of warfare.115 By contrast, a 
standard truck fitted with a rocket launcher or filled with explosives for a 
suicide attack is not a weapon system, as the truck was not designed to facil-
itate such attacks. In none of the sources surveyed were the terms substan-
tively distinguished. Accordingly, it is appropriate to treat the term “means 
of warfare” as encompassing both weapons and weapon systems, therefore 
the terms will be used interchangeably. 
Means of warfare stand in contrast to methods of warfare. The latter do 
not comprise equipment, but rather the tactics, techniques, and procedures 
(TTP) for carrying out military operations involving the conduct of hostili-
ties.116 Indeed, starvation and the use of human shields are both methods of 
warfare prohibited by international law,117 but neither necessarily requires the 
use of a means of warfare to be carried out. This distinction between means 
and methods in part explains the concern of some participants in the Addi-
tional Protocol I negotiations that the reference to methods in various pro-
visions imposed legal requirements going beyond those attaching to means 
of warfare.118 
 
A. A Survey of Damage Mechanisms 
 
Having distinguished between methods and means, it remains necessary to 
identify the required characteristic(s) for qualification as a means of warfare 
and assess whether cyber capabilities can qualify, and be subject to the legal 
prohibitions and obligations that attach as a result. At surface level, it might 
appear that tangibility is the key. After all, tangibility is signaled by the terms 
typically used in discussions of means—weapon, device, equipment, mate-
rial, arm, munition, instrument, mechanism, and so on. 
Yet tangibility has been rejected by some commentators in the cyber 
context, most notably the Tallinn Manual 2.0 experts. They included software 
                                                                                                                      
115. AMW MANUAL, supra note 18, r. 1(ff), cmt. ¶ 2, at 50; TALLINN MANUAL 2.0, supra 
note 20, at 452. 
116. AMW MANUAL, supra note 18, r. 1(v), cmt. ¶ 2, at 34; TALLINN MANUAL 2.0, supra 
note 20, r. 103(b), at 452–53. 
117. CIHL, supra note 8, rr. 53, 97, at 186–89, 337–40. 
118. 15 OFFICIAL RECORDS, supra note 69, at 369. 
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that is designed to conduct a “cyber attack” in their illustration of the term 
means of warfare.119 For them, the defining characteristic was not tangibility, 
but the consequences that are incident to the use of a means of warfare. If 
those consequences qualify use of the cyber capability as a “cyber attack,” as 
IHL employs that term, the “device, material, instrument, mechanism, equip-
ment, or software” under consideration is a means.120 In that regard, the ex-
perts understood a cyber attack as a “cyber operation, whether offensive or 
defensive, that is reasonably expected to cause injury or death to persons or 
damage or destruction to objects.”121 They treated a loss of functionality that 
requires repair of the system or is permanent as damage, although the experts 
were unable to achieve further consensus on the classification of other types 
of consequences.122 
This leads to a second possible distinguisher of means of warfare: direct 
causation. Here, examples include a direct causal connection between the 
means of warfare and physical damage to objects, the permanent loss of 
functionality of an object, or injury to persons.123 Design intent is essential 
in this regard. Consider a rock used to strike an enemy soldier during hand-
to-hand combat. The rock causes the qualifying consequences, but it is not 
designed to do so. As a result, it is not a weapon (means of warfare) in the 
IHL sense. By contrast, a small club crafted with the specific intent of use 
for striking someone is a weapon. Absent this requirement of design intent, 
the notion of means of warfare would become so overbroad as to preclude 
meaningful application of the relevant legal prohibitions and requirements. 
The condition of design intent to injure, kill, damage, or destroy neces-
sitates that the instrument of harm has some damage mechanism that causes 
the requisite consequence. Damage mechanisms need not be complex, or 
even mechanical (as with poison), but their intended use must be to cause 
harm. Mechanisms of definitively categorized weaponry include blunt force, 
penetration, blast, fragmentation, heat, fire, electrical, electromagnetic, 
                                                                                                                      
119. TALLINN MANUAL 2.0, supra note 20, r. 92, at 415–20. 
120. Id. at 452–53. 
121. Id. at 415. 
122. Id. at 417–18. 
123. The exception is the outdated Australian definition, which includes an “instrument 
of combat” used to “defeat or threaten” the enemy. See Legal Review of New Weapons, 
supra note 80, ¶ 3. 
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sound, radiation, chemical, and biological.124 By identifying the characteris-
tic(s) common to all damage mechanisms utilized by instruments accepted 
as weapons, it is possible to tease loose the essence of a means of warfare. 
To do so, key damage mechanisms are reviewed below. 
 
Blunt force: In all likelihood, the earliest tools used by humans to engage in 
combat were blunt-force objects. Whether the first weapon was a branch, 
rock, or another type of blunt-force tool, the purpose of its use was to inflict 
greater damage than the attacker’s body could achieve through striking, kick-
ing, biting, and the like. Modern examples of blunt-force weapons include 
the baton and truncheon. 
Blunt-force damage results from the transfer of mechanical energy, 
which is a form of kinetic energy, from the weapon to the target when the 
weapon accelerates toward the target. When the weapon and the target come 
into contact, energy transfers to the weaker of the two entities.125 This trans-
fer of kinetic energy from the object to its target is “terminal” in the sense 
that the damage mechanism is capable of directly causing the damage with-
out an intermediary mechanism or action. 
 
Penetration: Some damage mechanisms are intended to penetrate or perforate 
their target, as with a bayonet or a bullet. Penetration weapons are effective 
because the force employed is so concentrated that the weapon enters the 
target, as opposed to simply contacting it. However, like blunt force weap-
ons, the transfer of mechanical energy produces the damage. Penetration 
weapons can be combined with other damage mechanisms to cause addi-
tional harm after penetration of the protective layer. For example, “bunker 
busting” bombs are designed to cause damage first by penetrating a protec-
tive layer, the bunker, and then producing blast and fragmentation effects 
inside it.126 As with blunt force, the penetration damage mechanism itself 
delivers a terminal effect, that is, it causes the actual harm with no interme-
diary necessary. 
                                                                                                                      
124. STUART CASEY-MASLEN & STEVEN HAINES, HAGUE LAW INTERPRETED 18 
(2018). See also the explanations of various weapons in the Weapons Law Encyclopedia. WEAP-
ONS LAW ENCYCLOPEDIA, supra note 97. 
125. See MCGRAW HILL ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PHYSICS 523 (Sybil P. Parker ed., 1983) 
(discussing Newton’s third law of motion). 
126. Although developed as far back as World War Two, the bunker buster achieved 
prominence during Operation Desert Storm with the GBU-28. This weapon and its progeny 
use a short-delay time fuse to allow the weapon to penetrate the target before detonating. 
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Blast/fragmentation: The third type of damage mechanism that employs the 
transfer of kinetic energy is blast/fragmentation. Although blast and frag-
mentation are separate mechanisms, they typically occur in tandem. Blast 
damage is the result of a shock wave produced by overpressure resulting 
from the detonation of an explosive. The shock wave consists of highly com-
pressed air particles moving at a high rate of velocity.127 Kinetic energy stored 
in the shockwave is then transferred to the targeted person or object. Dam-
age may also be caused by the movement of air that floods into the vacuum 
created by the initial blast and from the heat given off as a byproduct of the 
explosion. 
The shell casing or objects within the shell inflict fragmentation damage 
when they are propelled outward by the force of the explosion. Secondary 
fragmentation results as objects unassociated with the device are struck by 
the blast wave or initial fragmentation and then carried along behind the blast 
wave, causing additional damage. The detonation of the shell directly causes 
all these effects; they are therefore, terminal effects. 
 
Heat/fire: Damage from heat results from the transfer of thermal energy, 
which is also a kinetic energy damage mechanism. Thermal energy is the 
movement of particles within a system and is transferred when two systems 
of differing temperatures contact one another. Transfer occurs because the 
systems attempt to achieve thermal energy equilibrium.128 Damage occurs 
when the target system cannot cope with the increased thermal energy, as 
with the burning of the skin. 
In weapons, the thermal energy typically transfers through thermal radi-
ation, as opposed to direct contact, convection, or conduction. Thermal ra-
diation, commonly referred to as heat, consists of electromagnetic waves 
emitted from the heat source.129 Battlefield damage from heat is typically 
produced by an explosive, with a rise in temperature occurring along the flow 
direction of a shock wave.130 However, certain weapons, such as the 
flamethrower and munitions containing napalm use heat as the primary dam-
age mechanism. In these cases, the ignited flammable liquid spreads out over 
the target, causing a direct transfer of thermal energy, as opposed to radiated 
                                                                                                                      
127. MCGRAW HILL ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PHYSICS, supra note 125, at 1047. 
128. Id. at 422. 
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energy. Whatever the method of heat transfer, it is the thermal energy pro-
duced by the weapon and transmitted to the target through thermal radiation 
that directly produces the terminal effect. 
 
Electrical: Some weapons employ electricity as the damage mechanism, as 
with a “Taser,”131 which delivers an electric current through electrodes fired 
at the target. The current disrupts voluntary control of muscle systems, with 
the intended effect of temporarily incapacitating the target. Like the previ-
ously described damage mechanisms, the passage of electrical current in-
volves the transfer of energy.132 The primary effect on the body is involuntary 
muscle contractions, resulting from the electricity overwhelming the nervous 
system’s natural electrical impulses.133 Although most often designed as non-
lethal weapons, some can deliver a lethal dose of electricity. As with the pre-
viously described damage mechanisms, the electricity causes the terminal ef-
fect, which is the loss of muscle system control. 
 
Electromagnetic and sound: In 1962, the Atomic Energy Commission launched 
a PGM-17 Thor that detonated a 1.45-megaton thermonuclear warhead at 
an altitude of two hundred fifty miles.134 The detonation generated an elec-
tromagnetic pulse (EMP) that, in addition to disrupting electrical and phone 
service in Hawaii one thousand miles away, damaged orbiting communica-
tions satellites. 135 The EMP occurred when the flux of gamma radiation from 
the nuclear explosion produced high-energy free electrons that became 
trapped in the Earth’s geomagnetic field.136 The interaction of the free elec-
trons with the magnetic field caused a short burst, or pulse, of electromag-
netic energy. 
In addition to the shorter, concentrated pulses, such as those resulting 
from nuclear detonations, accelerating, or oscillating electrical charges may 
produce disturbances in the form of continuous waves. When strong 
                                                                                                                      
131. Taser is actually the brand name of a device produced by Axon. See TASER Smart 
Weapons, AXON, https://www.axon.com/solutions/law-enforcement/in-the-field#smart-
weapons (last visited July 1, 2019). 
132. MCGRAW HILL ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PHYSICS, supra note 125, at 268. 
133. Physiological Effects of Electricity, ALL ABOUT CIRCUITS, www.allaboutcircuits.com/ 
textbook/direct-current/chpt-3/physiological-effects-electricity/ (last visited July 1, 2019). 
134. Gilbert King, Going Nuclear over the Pacific, SMITHSONIAN (Aug. 15, 2012), 
https://www.smithsonianmag.com/history/going-nuclear-over-the-pacific-24428997/. 
135. Id. 
136. R. EVERETT LANGFORD, INTRODUCTION TO WEAPONS OF MASS DESTRUCTION: 
RADIOLOGICAL, CHEMICAL, AND BIOLOGICAL 104 (2004). 
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enough, these waves can result in varying harmful effects. Weapons employ-
ing concentrated waves of energy as the damage mechanism are often re-
ferred to as directed-energy weapons, the most recognizable variant being 
the laser.137 Electromagnetic energy of a certain intensity, whether transmit-
ted through pulses or continuous waves, directly causes the terminal effect 
upon the target. 
Sound waves, such as ultra-high frequency sonic waves, are related to 
electromagnetic waves, but unlike the latter, which can transmit in empty 
space, they require a medium, such as air, water, or solids to transmit energy. 
However, like electromagnetic waves, they carry energy, producing damage 
by causing the target to vibrate excessively. A common, non-weaponized ex-
ample of damage caused by sound is a hearing loss caused by prolonged 
exposure to loud noises, such as construction work. In addition to sonic 
weapons, sound damage can also occur from the detonation of explosive 
weapons. In both examples, the direct transfer of sonic wave energy from a 
weapon to its target causes the damaging terminal effect. 
 
Radiological: Radiation damage mechanisms are designed to cause radiation 
poisoning or contamination of an area with a radiological source. Although 
radiological damage, together with blast, fragmentation, heat, and electro-
magnetic, is a key damage mechanism of nuclear weapons, simpler lower-
level devices such as “dirty bombs” (conventional explosives to which a ra-
diological source is attached) also employ this mechanism. 
The release of energy from an unstable atomic nucleus as it attempts to 
achieve stability causes radiological harm. In certain elements, like uranium, 
the release can occur naturally over a period known as a half-life. Thus, even 
after the employment of a radiological weapon, potential long-term damage 
may not be immediately manifest. Release can be the product of a human-
engineered forcing mechanism, such as an explosion, that triggers the spread 
of radiation. 
When alpha, beta, gamma, and neutron forms of radiation, or a combi-
nation thereof, are released, the energy transfers from that radiation to the 
matter into which it comes in contact. In living organisms, this damages the 
deoxyribonucleic acid (DNA), an effect that interferes with cellular repro-
duction. If the energy contained in the particle is strong enough, it can kill 
cells and cause relatively immediate death. However, when weaker particles 
                                                                                                                      
137. Laser is an acronym for “light amplification by stimulated emission of radiation.” 
See SPENCER TUCKER, INSTRUMENTS OF WAR 353 (2015). 
 
 
 
Classification of Cyber Capabilities and Operations Vol. 95 
209 
 
 
 
 
 
 
damage the DNA severely enough, long-term effects such as cancer and 
birth defects can occur. 138 Although this damage may not manifest itself for 
long periods and other factors can exacerbate it, immediate harm directly 
results from the terminal effect of the radiological damage mechanism. 
 
Chemical: Many weapons rely upon chemicals to function, but not all of these 
weapons qualify as chemical weapons. For example, explosives work on 
chemical principles but they are not regulated as chemical weapons. The dis-
tinction is clear in the 1993 Chemical Weapons Convention, which defines 
a chemical weapon as “toxic chemicals and their precursors,” as well as the 
“[m]unitions and devices, specifically designed to cause death or other harm 
through the toxic properties of those toxic chemicals.”139 Under the Con-
vention, a toxic chemical is “[a]ny chemical which through its chemical ac-
tion can cause death, temporary incapacitation or permanent harm to hu-
mans or animals.”140 
Chemical weapons are unique in that they include both agents that act 
through a transfer of energy, as with a burning agent, and agents utilizing a 
non-organic toxin that causes damage by interfering with organic functions, 
as opposed to the transfer of energy. Examples of chemical weapons include 
blister agents, blood agents, choking agents, nerve agents, lacrimators (tear 
gas), vomiting agents, irritants, and psychotropic compounds. They generally 
work through contact or inhalation, and while some agents are designed to 
produce temporary incapacitation, others can cause permanent damage or 
death.141 In both cases, they directly inflict damage on their target with no 
required intermediary. 
 
Biological: The 1972 Biological Weapons Convention prohibits States Party 
from developing, producing, stockpiling, or otherwise acquiring or retaining 
“microbial or other biological agents, or toxins whatever their origin or 
method of production, of types and in quantities that have no justification 
for prophylactic, protective or other peaceful purposes” in addition to their 
                                                                                                                      
138. The body’s cellular repair mechanisms are capable of fixing broken single strands 
of DNA. However, when the radiation breaks both strands of the DNA molecule, the body 
is generally unable to repair the strand. This type of damage is more common with the larger 
alpha particles. See LANGFORD, supra note 136, at 38–44. 
139. Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production, Stockpiling and 
Use of Chemical Weapons and on their Destruction art. II(1), Jan. 13, 1993, 1974 U.N.T.S. 
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delivery mechanisms.142 Their harm mechanism is biological in character, as 
opposed to chemical, because organic pathogens or other microorganisms 
produce the toxin that causes the disease.143 Typical biological toxins include 
bacteria, rickettsia, fungi, and viruses. Like some chemical toxins, biological 
weapons do not inflict harm through the transfer of energy; instead, they 
interfere with natural biological functions.144 Although there is no transfer of 
energy, the damage mechanism is nonetheless terminal as the toxin’s inter-
action with the target directly inflicts the harm. 
 
B. Determinative Characteristic of a Means of Warfare 
 
From the survey of damage mechanisms, it is possible to identify common 
characteristics, thereby allowing cyber capabilities to be assessed against 
them to determine their qualification as means of warfare that are subject to 
the legal obligations and prohibitions set forth earlier. As discussed below, 
while some of the damage mechanisms share several characteristics, the sole 
common, and therefore determinative, trait is the ability to deliver a terminal 
effect directly on a target. Before turning to that feature, it is helpful to rule 
out other potential commonalities. 
The characteristic that is perhaps most likely to be viewed as defining a 
means of warfare is the transfer of energy, as with mechanical, thermal, ra-
diological, and electromagnetic damage mechanisms. Yet, some chemical— 
and all biological—weapons do not involve the transfer of energy. Since their 
status as a means of warfare is beyond question, energy transfer cannot serve 
as a required qualification. 
Another shared characteristic of many weapons is that the harm trig-
gered by the damage mechanism manifests in an immediate and discernable 
manner, as in the case of being shot. However, not all damage mechanisms 
generate an immediate effect. A number of mechanisms, like radiological, 
inflict harm internally, sometimes only at the cellular level, which may not 
surface for years. A low-yield radiological device, for instance, is unlikely to 
                                                                                                                      
142. Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production and Stockpiling 
of Bacteriological (Biological) and Toxin Weapons and on their Destruction art. 1, Apr. 10, 
1972, 26 U.S.T. 583, 1015 U.N.T.S. 163. 
143. The United States defined toxins during the treaty negotiations as “poisonous sub-
stances produced by biological organisms, including microbes, animals, and plants.” United 
States, Policy on Toxins: Working Paper Submitted to the Conference of the Committee on 
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achieve any immediate effect against personnel or equipment but is certainly 
a weapon in light of the foreseeable likelihood that it will cause severe health 
problems, even if sometimes only over the longer term. Even the blast dam-
age from an explosive device may not be apparent until long after its use, as 
in the case of traumatic brain injuries.145 Accordingly, the ability to immedi-
ately recognize or measure harm cannot be considered a condition precedent 
to qualification as a means of warfare. And while the harm that eventually 
results from use of a weapon is usually discernable, that is not universally the 
case. For instance, an electromagnetic pulse device may never result in visu-
ally identifiable harm, other than the fact that an electronic system perma-
nently ceases to function. 
In contrast, there are two defining characteristics common to all means 
of warfare damage mechanisms. First, the effect must be to injure or kill 
persons or damage or destroy objects. As noted above, IHL provides pro-
tections against such consequences during an attack. Devices and systems 
that do not produce these effects are generally not considered as means of 
warfare. For example, a system such as an EA-6B Prowler aircraft that jams 
enemy radar and communications is not a weapon,146 nor is an aircraft that 
merely monitors enemy signals like the EP-3E Aires.147 
Second, means of warfare are designed to directly produce a terminal 
effect. An effect is terminal when no intermediary or intervening device or 
action beyond the weapon itself is required for the harm to occur. The harm 
may be visible or not, immediate or not, or kinetic or not, but it always di-
rectly results from the damage mechanism associated with the weapon. In 
other words, the weapon itself causes harm. Reflecting this commonality, 
Bill Boothby has observed, “[m]eans of warfare consist of all weapons, weap-
ons platforms and associated equipment used directly to deliver force during 
hostilities.”148 
Combining these factors, we suggest that having a damage mechanism 
with the ability to directly inflict the damaging or injurious terminal effect on 
                                                                                                                      
145. See generally Michael Schmitt & Chad Highfill, Invisible Injuries: Concussive Effects and 
International Humanitarian Law, 9 HARVARD NATIONAL SECURITY JOURNAL 72 (2018). 
146. EA-6B Prowler Electronic Warfare Aircraft, UNITED STATES NAVY, https://www. 
navy.mil/navydata/fact_display.asp?cid=1100&tid=900&ct=1 (last updated Feb. 5, 2009). 
147. P-3C Orion and EP-3 Aries, UNITED STATES NAVY, https://www.navy.mil/na-
vydata/fact_display.asp?cid=1100&tid=1400&ct=1 (last updated Dec. 3, 2008). 
148. William H. Boothby, Methods and Means of Cyber Warfare, 89 INTERNATIONAL LAW 
STUDIES 387, 387 (2013). In the same article, Boothby assesses the potential for the exist-
ence of cyber weapons and means of warfare, finding the critical factor to be the ultimate 
effects of the operation. Id. at 389. 
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a target is the litmus test for qualification as a means of warfare. To reiterate, 
the requisite terminal effect is caused without an intermediary mechanism or 
action. Consider a cell phone used to detonate an improvised explosive de-
vice (IED). The cell phone, which was not designed to be integral to the 
operation of a means of warfare, communicates with the IED, but it is the 
IED that delivers the required terminal effect through its blast damage 
mechanism. The cell phone is not a means of warfare, whereas the IED 
qualifies as such. Or, consider a sonic device. It causes the body’s organs to 
vibrate excessively to the point of physical damage, and therefore, it delivers 
the terminal effect. Although the consequence of the organ damage may not 
be immediately apparent, it is a means of warfare. And consider a ruse oper-
ation in which one party to the conflict transmits false enemy communica-
tions that cause some members of the enemy forces to go to a location where 
they are ambushed. 149 But for the transmission of the false signals, the attack 
would not have occurred, and those ambushed would not have died. How-
ever, the devices used to transmit the signals did not deliver the terminal 
effect. Rather, the weapons used in the ambush to wound and kill the enemy 
did so.  
Armed with these defining characteristics of means of warfare, cyber ca-
pabilities can be assessed to determine whether they qualify as means of war-
fare. The weight of scholarly opinion currently slants towards classifying 
some cyber capabilities as means of warfare. Both the AMW Manual and 
Tallinn Manual 2.0 adopt this position,150 as do some scholars.151 The ten-
dency is to focus on the nature of the consequence of a cyber operation, the 
first of the two defining characteristics. As Tallinn Manual 2.0 states, 
 
“Means of cyber warfare” are cyber weapons and their associated cyber 
systems . . . . 
[C]yber weapons are cyber means of warfare that are used, designed, 
or intended to be used to cause injury to, or death of, persons or damage 
to, or destruction of, objects, that is, that result in the consequences re-
quired for qualification of a cyber operation as an attack. . . . 
                                                                                                                      
149. AP I, supra note 7, art. 37(2); UK LOAC MANUAL, supra note 52, ¶ 5.17.2. 
150. AMW MANUAL, supra note 18, r. 1(t), cmt. ¶ 5, at 31; TALLINN MANUAL 2.0, supra 
note 20, at 452. 
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Cyber means of warfare, therefore, include any cyber device, materiel, 
instrument, mechanism, equipment, or software used, designed, or in-
tended to be used to conduct a cyber attack.152 
 
Of particular importance in the cyber context is the extension of the 
notion of damage to include loss of functionality. Thus, a cyber operation 
that “bricks” cyber infrastructure or requires replacement of components 
without physically damaging the system would be an attack such that the 
device, system, or code used to execute the operation would comprise a 
weapon and perhaps, considered ensemble, a weapon system (both of which 
are means of warfare).153 
However, as reflected in the use of the term capability instead of weapon 
or means of warfare by the U.S. Air Force and UK Ministry of Defence,154 
some States seem reluctant to characterize even cyber capabilities capable of 
causing the requisite consequences as means of warfare. Although no State 
has publicly explained its rationale for avoiding the branding of cyber capa-
bilities as means of warfare, the apprehension of those falling into this camp 
is well founded because cyber capabilities do not satisfy the previously iden-
tified defining characteristics. 
In particular, analysis of whether network systems (and their compo-
nents) or computer code used in a cyber operation are a means of warfare 
must go beyond a simple catalog of an operation’s ultimate effects. Consider 
an incident in which an individual gains physical access to industrial plant 
controls and manipulates the cooling system in a manner that causes physical 
damage when components overheat. The requisite effects occurred, but that 
individual clearly did not employ any weapon. The fact that a remote cyber 
operation can cause precisely the same effect illustrates that the definitional 
analysis of means of warfare requires an additional step that examines how 
the effect was produced, that is, whether the capability in question directly 
caused the terminal effect, the second criterion associated with means of 
warfare. 
                                                                                                                      
152. TALLINN MANUAL 2.0, supra note 20, at 452–53. Tallinn Manual 2.0 defines a “cyber 
attack” as “a cyber operation, whether offensive or defensive, that is reasonably expected 
to cause injury or death to persons or damage or destruction to objects.” Id. r. 92, at 415–
20. 
153. Id. at 417–18. Note that the Tallinn Manual experts were unable to agree upon the 
precise threshold at which an effect on cyber infrastructure would amount to a loss of func-
tionality. Id. 
154. See supra notes 77, 88–90 and accompanying text. 
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To comprehend when terminal effects are delivered in the cyber context, 
a basic understanding of the primary aspects of a cyber operation: computer 
systems, network infrastructure, and data is useful. A combination of hard-
ware and software make up computer systems. Hardware consists of the 
physical components of a computer used to process and store data. Various 
types of data referred to as software control the hardware components. 
Computer systems receive, process, and interpret inputs, then subsequently 
store or deliver an output based on its operating instructions. 
Networks are created when individual computer systems are connected 
through shared nodes (active electronic distribution devices) that originate, 
route, or collect data via a data link. These networks may then connect to 
other networks, creating larger networks, such as the global Internet. Like 
computer systems, networks are also composed of hardware and the resident 
operational software. When a system or network is not directly connected to 
any other outside systems or networks, they are referred to as air-gapped 
systems or networks, and data communications can generally be delivered 
only by direct access, such as inputs from a user or insertion using storage 
media like a memory stick. 
Any individual node connected to a network, such as the Internet, can 
send data to, and receive it from, any other connected node. Communication 
of the data occurs through a series of relayed requests between nodes that 
sit on common borders between multiple networks through which the data 
is being routed. This data may constitute either information or instructions 
to be interpreted or acted upon by another system. Operating instructions 
are a type of data known as computer, or program code. Computer program-
mers typically write in the source code of a programming language, which 
then translates the instructions into machine code from which a computer 
can execute the required tasks. Additional data may be delivered and inter-
preted by the program code in the execution of the system’s tasks. 
Concerning qualification as a means of warfare, it is possible to rule out 
as part of a weapons system, and therefore means of warfare, any system or 
network infrastructure component used to conduct the hostile cyber opera-
tion that was not purpose-built to conduct such operations. Recall that only 
systems designed to employ, or directly support employment, of a weapon 
are means of warfare. For example, the off-the-shelf cyber infrastructure 
used to mount an attack does not qualify as a means of warfare under inter-
national law. By contrast, cyber infrastructure that is specifically designed to 
conduct hostile cyber operations would qualify, but only if the data it com-
municates to the target system itself amounts to a weapon. 
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Thus, the issue of the data, specifically code, is key. The fulcrum on 
which this analysis rests is the fact that code is nothing more than a commu-
nicated set of instructions interpreted and acted upon by a set of system or 
network components. Those instructions can only cause the requisite phys-
ical effect if transmitted to a system in control of a tangible object. Some-
times the tangible object is a system or network hardware, such as the cooling 
system for a server. In this case, the malicious code may cause failure or 
damage to the hardware component. However, computer systems often con-
trol objects that, if malevolently manipulated, can have damaging effects be-
yond the boundaries of the computer system. An example would be com-
municating malicious instructions to a navigational satellite that results in the 
unavailability of information it provides terrestrial systems. The consequence 
could be the crash of aircraft or collision of ships that rely on the satellite’s 
positional data. 
Supervisory control and data acquisition (SCADA) systems are computer 
networks that control industrial equipment. These networks utilize a pro-
grammable logic controller (PLC), which is a computer adapted to control 
physical processes as diverse as telecommunications, manufacturing, dam 
operation, oil and gas refining, transportation, and electrical grid operation. 
SCADA systems generally work by gathering information from a network of 
sensors, feeding that data through a series of analytical programs in a super-
visory computer, and issuing instructions to the PLCs based on the results 
of that analysis. Although most SCADA systems have a human-machine in-
terface element, some operate independently of human control. 
SCADA systems offer the greatest potential for physical destruction re-
sulting from a cyber operation. Stuxnet, for example, was a malicious worm 
that targeted the SCADA system controlling centrifuges at the Natanz nu-
clear facility in Iran. The Stuxnet worm caused these centrifuges to rotate at 
an excessive speed, resulting in physical damage.155 Similarly, the 2015 oper-
ation against the Ukrainian power grid involved manipulation of the SCADA 
system controlling power substations.156 While Stuxnet operated through 
pre-written instructions for the SCADA system, the Ukrainian power-grid 
                                                                                                                      
155. Kim Zetter, An Unprecedented Look at Stuxnet, the World’s First Digital Weapon, WIRED 
(Nov. 3, 2014), www.wired.com/2014/11/countdown-to-zero-day-stuxnet/. 
156. Kim Zetter, Inside the Cunning, Unprecedented Hack of Ukraine’s Power Grid, WIRED 
(Mar. 3, 2016), https://www.wired.com/2016/03/inside-cunning-unprecedented-hack-ukr 
aines-power-grid/. 
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operation was conducted remotely by a malicious actor taking real-time con-
trol of aspects of the SCADA system.157 Despite this difference, both sets of 
effects ultimately resulted from the communication of a set of instructions 
acted upon by the target system. Still, it was the action of the targeted system 
receiving and interpreting the delivered data that in turn caused the physical 
effects. The code sent by the malicious actor achieved its effects in an indi-
rect manner because it had to be acted upon by the target system. Thus, 
although the communicated code ultimately resulted in the physical damage, 
it did so indirectly and therefore was not the cause of the terminal effect. 
But what of cyber operations directed against data itself? Do the systems 
and code used to mount the operation qualify as weapons because the ter-
minal effect is to damage, alter, or destroy the data? 
At first glance, it might seem that the answer turns upon whether data is 
an object, such that to the extent it is affected there is physical damage. How-
ever, this long-standing debate in international law circles is a red herring in 
terms of qualification as a weapon. Even if one takes the position that data 
is an object that can be damaged or destroyed, the question remains as to 
whether the networked system and the code it communicates as part of a 
malicious operation caused the terminal effect on the data. 
In such an operation, there is no intermediary PLC or other device con-
trolling a physical object upon which an effect occurs, as data resident in the 
targeted system itself is the objective. Numerous methods for manipulating 
or erasing data exist. For example, after a malicious actor gains access to a 
system, he or she can communicate malicious code to the target system, in-
structing it to alter or delete its program code (or even source code), or to 
manipulate or delete (overwrite) informational data.158 The method used will 
depend on the aims of the actor, the level of access gained, and the vulnera-
bility exploited. 
But whether utilizing pre-written code or real-time operator inputs, in 
every case the hostile actor is simply communicating instructions to the tar-
get system. The system interprets the instruction and acts based on it, as 
when it alters or erases data. Thus, there is always an intermediate step be-
tween the hostile action and the terminal effect. These steps are difficult to 
conceptualize because they often take place in measures of time so small as 
                                                                                                                      
157. Id. 
158. See, e.g., Kim Zetter, ‘Google’ Hackers Had Ability to Alter Source Code, WIRED (Mar. 
3, 2010), https://www.wired.com/2010/03/source-code-hacks/. 
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to appear simultaneous. However, the harmful effects are nevertheless indi-
rect; they are not terminal vis-à-vis the code. Therefore, by their very nature, 
computer code and associated systems cannot qualify as means of warfare. 
This counterintuitive conclusion is logical when viewed in the abstract. 
Digital data is but a form of language, and computer code is simply a com-
munication from one system to another system or from one component of 
a system to another. Much like human communications, they never directly 
cause the requisite effects. The cyber operation may ultimately result in such 
an effect, but the entity actually causing the terminal effect is the system re-
ceiving the communication. To illustrate this point with a non-cyber exam-
ple, consider a case in which a human air traffic controller falsely tells an 
aircraft experiencing altimeter malfunction in bad weather that it is at two 
thousand feet above ground level. In fact, the aircraft is only five hundred 
feet above ground level, and as a result, it crashes upon approach to landing. 
The direct cause of the crash (terminal effect) is the pilot taking the physical 
steps to descend the plane into the ground short of the runway, not the com-
munication. Whereas the controller is responsible for the crash, no one 
would consider the communication to be a weapon. There is no reason to 
distinguish this human-to-human communication from computer-to-com-
puter communication or some combination of the two. 
It might be asserted that computer code should amount to a weapon 
because it is analogous to two types of damage mechanisms—biological and 
electromagnetic. Like biological weapons, cyber capabilities do not involve 
the transfer of energy. However, a virus is a physical organism that directly 
causes physical damage to the target’s healthy cells, which can occur either 
by killing health cells or by interfering with their normal function. The tar-
geted body need not take any action for the virus to cause the damage. This 
is unlike cyber operations, which require the targeted system to take actions 
based on the delivered communication to achieve the desired effect. 
It is similarly tempting to equate cyber capabilities with electromagnetic 
weapons, such as the electromagnetic pulse or directed-energy weapons dis-
cussed above. While cyber capabilities utilize the electromagnetic spectrum, 
there is an important distinction. An electromagnetic weapon employs the 
electromagnetic wave as a damage mechanism that involves the transfer of 
energy. In cyber capabilities, the electromagnetic wave transports a commu-
nication. As a result, electromagnetic weapons directly deliver the damaging 
effect, while cyber capabilities do not. 
In sum, because computer code is a communication it cannot constitute 
a damage mechanism because it does not deliver a terminal effect. As such, 
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we conclude that code used in hostile cyber operations does not qualify as a 
means of warfare as a matter of logic and law. If code is not a weapon, the 
network hardware components that deliver it to the target system do not 
comprise components of a weapon system. The exception is the network 
system designed to employ, or assist in the employment, of a weapon with a 
damage mechanism, such as the computer controlling a surface-to-air missile 
system. Thus, although the Tallinn Manual 2.0 experts did not reject classifi-
cation of cyber capabilities as a means of warfare, they were prescient in 
defining a weapon as “that aspect of the system used to cause damage or 
destruction to objects or injury or death to persons.”159 This code does not 
do. 
 
C. Use of Code as a Method of Warfare 
 
All of the above definitions and discussions of the term methods of warfare 
are encompassed within the Tallinn Manual 2.0 explication of a method of 
warfare as how “hostilities are conducted.”160 The Manual states, 
 
The phrase ‘cyber tactics, techniques, and procedures whereby hostilities 
are conducted’ does not include cyber activities that, for instance, involve 
communications between friendly forces. On the other hand, it is intended 
to denote more than those operations that rise to the level of an ‘attack’ 
(Rule 92). For example, a particular type of cyber operation designed to 
interfere with the enemy’s capability to communicate may not qualify as an 
attack (as that term is used in this Manual), but would constitute a method 
of warfare.161 
 
We agree that this definition accurately captures the meaning of the term 
method of warfare in the IHL context. Thus, although communications per 
se, including communications by cyber means, cannot logically be consid-
ered a means of warfare, in our view cyber operations are properly charac-
terized as a method of warfare when employed to harm or interfere with 
enemy forces, military objectives, the civilian population, or civilian objects. 
The fact that cyber operations generally do not employ a means of warfare 
has no bearing on their qualification as such. As previously mentioned, there 
is no requirement that a means of warfare be used when engaging in a 
                                                                                                                      
159. TALLINN MANUAL 2.0, supra note 20, at 452. 
160. Id. r. 103(b), at 452–53. 
161. Id. at 453. 
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method of warfare. There being no such requirement, it is unnecessary that 
the cyber capability in question directly causes the terminal effect. 
Characterizing cyber operations as a method of warfare makes sense on 
several grounds. First, they are typically categorized by methodology—hack-
ing, phishing, distributed denial of service, honeypot, watering hole, et cetera. 
Second, the development of a single piece of code to exploit a specific vul-
nerability, which then allows an operator to gain access to and manipulate an 
opponent’s system, resembles a TTP more closely than the creation of a 
weapon. And like TTP, the code may need to be refined regularly to take 
account of enemy actions or to be tailored to a particular operation to 
achieve its desired effects. In fact, the cyber operator sometimes writes the 
code in real-time as the operation reacts to changing conditions. 
To summarize, a means of warfare is the instrumentality that directly 
causes the terminal effect of death, injury, damage, or destruction. Code and 
its associated cyber infrastructure only indirectly cause that effect by instruct-
ing the targeted system to perform an action. It is this action that typically 
causes the terminal effect. Methods of warfare refers to techniques for harm-
ing the enemy or civilian population, the “how” of the conduct of hostilities. 
The exploitation of vulnerabilities in enemy systems is one such possibility 
and exploiting these vulnerabilities is one method for achieving the desired 
effects in the battlespace. 
 
V. INTERNATIONAL LAW IMPLICATIONS 
 
Having concluded that cyber capabilities cannot meet the definition of a 
weapon or means of warfare, but that cyber operations may qualify as meth-
ods of warfare, it is possible to address the three legal issues that are deter-
mined by these characterizations—the requirement for legal review, taking 
of precautions in attack, and the transportation of munitions across neutral 
territory. The conclusions reached based on these characterizations are of 
particular practical importance regarding the conduct of cyber operations. 
 
A. Legal Reviews of Weapons, Means, and Methods 
 
Assertions that cyber capabilities, and particularly computer code, constitute 
means of warfare present significant practical problems due to what military 
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strategists often refer to as the “speed of cyber.”162 This term references the 
ability to achieve rapid effects, sometimes measured in fractions of a second, 
on the battlefield. Although cyber operations can take weeks or months of 
detailed preparation,163 particular phases of those operations that rely on rap-
idly developed capabilities can be very short. Indeed, and as noted above, in 
some cases, cyber capabilities are developed and employed in real-time. The 
development of automated systems to detect threats, analyze target vulnera-
bilities, develop response capabilities, and deploy those capabilities will in-
creasingly compress timelines.164 
Recognizing this dilemma, a majority of the Tallinn Manual 2.0 experts 
concluded that the weapon review requirement does not require a formal 
legal review before employment of a cyber capability. Instead, they opined 
that “the advice of a legal advisor at the relevant level of command . . . suf-
fice[s].”165 In particular, they concluded “[i]f a method or means of cyber 
warfare is being developed for immediate operational use, the lawyer who 
advises the commander planning to use it will be responsible for advising 
whether the cyber weapon or the intended method of its use accord with the 
State’s international law obligations.”166 Nevertheless, even with legal advis-
ers in cyber mission planning cells, the pace of cyber operations could prove 
a significant obstacle to the rendering of meaningful reviews.167 
Moreover, many cyber capabilities are tailored to achieve a specialized 
objective and consist of specific exploits designed to take advantage of par-
ticular vulnerabilities in the targeted cyber infrastructure. As such, they are 
either non-reusable or require alteration with each employment. This reality 
would impose a significant practical burden on forces employing cyber ca-
pabilities because of the volume of reviews required if code is considered a 
means of warfare. By contrast, most conventional weapons are fungible in 
                                                                                                                      
162. See, e.g., J.R. Wilson, Cyber Warfare Takes a Front Seat in U.S. Military Operations, 
MILITARY & AEROSPACE ELECTRONICS (Dec. 1, 2017), https://www.militaryaerospace. 
com/trusted-computing/article/16709751/cyber-warfare-takes-a-front-seat-in-us-military-
operations. 
163. George Seffers, Speed of Cyber is Not Always in Milliseconds, SIGNAL (Oct. 1, 2018), 
https://www.afcea.org/content/speed-cyber-not-always-milliseconds. 
164. See generally Caitríona H. Heinl, Artificial (Intelligent) Agents and Active Cyber Defence: 
Policy Implications, in 6TH INTERNATIONAL CONFERENCE ON CYBER CONFLICT 53 (Pascal 
Brangetto, Markus Maybaum & Jan Stinissen eds., 2014). 
165. TALLINN MANUAL 2.0, supra note 20, at 465. 
166. Id. at 466. 
167. Although outside the scope of this article, the rapid pace of cyber operations 
might even necessitate the automation of legal reviews. 
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the sense that they may be employed in a wide variety of situations, all of 
which can be encompassed in the initial formal legal review. 
Although operational exigencies do not relieve States of international le-
gal obligations, States need to grasp the impact that normative interpretation 
has on practices. If cyber capabilities were a means of warfare, procedures 
would need to be developed to accommodate the aforementioned realities. 
However, by our definition, these obstacles do not exist for cyber capabili-
ties. Rather, a legal review is required only if the cyber operation amounts to 
a method of warfare and only if the State is either a party to Additional Pro-
tocol I or the requirement is customary. While we agree with those States 
that do not treat the requirement for legal reviews of methods of warfare as 
customary in nature, we also recognize that this position may shift over time. 
States, of course, may also make a policy choice to conduct legal reviews of 
types of cyber operations, as the United States does.168 
In assessing the scope of the legal obligation, it is useful to recall that 
methods of warfare are the tactics, techniques, and procedures (TTPs) for 
conducting hostilities. TTPs do not refer to individual operations, but rather 
to how operations are conducted, as they are categories of operations. The 
AMW Manual also adopts this approach, defining aerial methods of warfare 
as “the various general categories of operations, such as bombing, as well as 
the special tactics used for an attack, such as high-altitude bombing.”169 
Thus, with respect to legal reviews of cyber methods of warfare, a review 
is not required for each individual cyber capability. Rather, for States bearing 
the obligation or adopting it as a matter of policy, the review requirement 
encompasses only the various TTP for employing categories of cyber capa-
bilities. The law does not require a specific taxonomy or format for reviews 
of methods of warfare, and the development of a schema in the cyber con-
text is beyond the scope of this article. The more important point is that the 
review only extends to the expected use of a category of cyber operation.170 
Of course, use of a particular cyber capability utilizing a set of TTPs in 
an individual attack would still have to comply with all prohibitions and lim-
itations that apply to attacks, a contextual determination. To illustrate, con-
sider the use of a weaponized honeypot,171 a method of warfare subject to 
                                                                                                                      
168. See supra notes 25–32 and accompanying text. 
169. AMW MANUAL, supra note 18, r. 1(v), at 34–35. 
170. COMMENTARY ON THE ADDITIONAL PROTOCOLS, supra note 91, ¶ 1125. 
171. A weaponized honeypot is a system configured to be both attractive and vulnera-
ble to adversarial entities, which when exploited by that adversary contains malicious code. 
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review. Even if such operations pass muster as a method of warfare, use of 
the technique in circumstances likely to affect civilians might be barred by 
the prohibition on indiscriminate attack172 and, if nevertheless meeting that 
limitation, the rule of proportionality and the requirement to take precau-
tions in attack.173 While those who plan, approve, and execute a cyber oper-
ation bear the burden of decision in these cases, given the complexity of 
cyber operations, the immediate availability of a legal adviser is strongly ad-
visable and a best practice militaries should adopt. 
 
B. Selection of Means and Methods of Warfare 
 
The requirement to select from among feasible means of warfare to mini-
mize incidental death or injury to civilians and damage to civilian property 
does not apply to cyber capabilities for they do not qualify as such. However, 
as methods of warfare, cyber operations are governed by the same require-
ment. Because the obligation is customary,174 it is binding on all States. 
As a result, a party to an armed conflict is obliged, subject to the condi-
tion of feasibility, to conduct a cyber operation in lieu of a kinetic one when 
the former is likely to cause less collateral damage to civilians or civilian ob-
jects and it is unlikely that military advantage will be sacrificed by conducting 
the cyber operation. For instance, consider a proposed kinetic attack against 
a civilian radio station used to transmit coded messages to enemy forces. 
Assume that civilians will likely be hurt or killed in the attack, but given the 
importance of disrupting the transmissions, the strike does not violate the 
rule of proportionality. If using available cyber means can render the relevant 
equipment non-functional, the attacker would be obligated to employ them 
as a matter of law. Conversely, sometimes a non-cyber method of warfare 
poses less risk to protected persons and objects, such as a precise kinetic 
strike against an isolated military facility that relies on the civilian electrical 
grid. Here, the kinetic strike poses less risk of collateral harm to civilians and 
civilian objects than a cyber attack against the electrical grid. 
The obligation to select among methods of warfare applies to cyber op-
erations when those operations pose differing risks of causing damage (in-
cluding loss of functionality) or destruction of civilian objects, or injury or 
                                                                                                                      
See Rock Stevens & Jeffrey Biller, Offensive Digital Countermeasures: Exploring the Implications for 
Governments, 3 CYBER DEFENSE REVIEW, Fall 2018, at 93. 
172. AP I, supra note 7, art. 51(4); CIHL, supra note 8, rr. 11–12, at 37–43. 
173. AP I, supra note 7, arts. 51 & 57; CIHL, supra note 8, chs. 4–5, at 46–67. 
174. CIHL, supra note 8, r. 17, at 56–58. 
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death of civilians. As an example, take the case of a proposed cyber attack 
against an electricity generating facility to deprive the enemy forces of power 
during a specified period Imagine that the cyber attack presents risks to the 
civilian population such as disruption of medical care, emergency services, 
and civil defense. One option might be to encrypt the supporting cyber in-
frastructure during the requisite period, while another is to cause the system 
to overheat, thereby damaging it and requiring significant repair before it 
returns to full service. If both options were feasible, the former method of 
warfare would have to be selected because it achieves the effect sought by 
the attacking party and does so with less risk of collateral damage to the 
civilian population. 
Although a facile reading of the provision indicates only choice among 
varying methods is required, there may be circumstances in which options 
falling within a particular category of cyber methods present themselves. The 
obligation should logically be understood as extending to choices within a 
particular category of methods as well. Consider again the attack on an elec-
trical grid. One type of malware will permanently encrypt key components 
of the network, whereas another will only do so temporarily, but throughout 
the period during which the military commander wants to deprive enemy 
assets of power. The fact that both employ encryption as a method of war-
fare does not relieve the commander of the obligation to select the latter if 
it avoids or minimizes collateral damage. 
 
C. Passage of Cyber Capabilities through Neutral States 
 
As noted above, the customary law of neutrality, codified in Hague Conven-
tion V, prohibits the transportation of “munitions of war or supplies” across 
neutral territory.175 In that cyber capabilities are not means of warfare, the 
transmission of hostile code through cyber infrastructure located on neutral 
territory does not breach the prohibition. Nor are cyber capabilities prohib-
ited as supplies; for just as it is illogical to view communications as munitions 
or weapons, it is also illogical to view them as supplies. 
More appropriately, cyber capabilities, as a communication, should fall 
under Article 8 of Hague Convention V, which does not require a “neutral 
Power . . . to forbid or restrict the use on behalf of the belligerents of tele-
graph or telephone cables or of wireless telegraphy apparatus belonging to it 
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or to companies or private individuals.”176 We align ourselves with the Tallinn 
Manual 2.0 experts who were of the view that this exception applied mutatis 
mutandis to communication by cyber means. In the same way that a commu-
nication providing intelligence information or ordering the movement of 
troops qualifies for the exception, so too should any form of cyber commu-
nication, even those that may involve the transmission of code that will con-
tribute to an attack on enemy forces. Thus, the knowing transmission of 
harmful computer code by cyber communications across neutral territory 
does not violate the law of neutrality, nor does a neutral State violate the law 
of neutrality when it knows of such transmissions and fails to stop them. 
 
VI. CONCLUSION 
 
In 2013, Tom Rid described a weapon as “a tool that is used, or designed to 
be used, with the aim of threatening or causing physical, functional, or men-
tal harm to structures, systems, or living things.”177 Adapting this definition 
to the cyber context, he defined a cyber weapon as “computer code that is 
used, or designed to be used, with the aim of threatening or causing physical, 
functional, or mental harm to structures, systems, or living beings.”178 
With the passage of time, Rid has had second thoughts. In his afterword 
to the reprinting of the book in 2017, he observes, 
 
[t]he dynamics of vulnerability discovery, exploit development, payload de-
sign, entry vectors, command-and-control infrastructure, scalability, exfil-
tration, disclosure, counter-forensics, or patching are diverse and fast-
evolving. Most weapons analogies break down even more quickly today 
than they did four years ago. Serious research and wider public debate 
would be best served if we all stop using the hackneyed moniker ‘cyber 
weapons’ entirely.179 
 
Although Rid may not have been thinking in terms of international law, 
he is nevertheless correct. The physical damage (including loss of function-
ality) or injury that occurs as the result of malicious computer code used in 
a cyber attack is the result of actions ultimately undertaken by the targeted 
system itself. The code is but a communication to that system instructing it 
                                                                                                                      
176. 1907 Hague Convention No. V, supra note 13, art. 8; see also DOD LAW OF WAR 
MANUAL, supra note 25, § 16.4.1; TALLINN MANUAL 2.0, supra note 20, at 556–57. 
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to undertake a harmful action, function in an unintended manner, or cease 
to function. In no other type of weapon is an intervening step by the target 
itself required to achieve the sought-after harm. Thus, the notion that a com-
munication of code alone can constitute a damage mechanism fails to stand 
up to logical and legal analysis based on current understandings of means of 
warfare. That said, there is no question that categories of cyber operations 
are methods of warfare subject to relevant legal prohibitions and limitations, 
as well as policy restrictions. 
In no way do our conclusions upset the foundational balance animating 
IHL between the humanitarian considerations and military necessity.180 
Cyber operations that amount to an attack remain fully subject to the nu-
merous targeting provisions of IHL. And for States party to Additional Pro-
tocol I, the requirement for legal reviews of methods of warfare provides an 
additional layer of analysis that should be adopted as a matter of policy by 
those that are not a party to the instrument. These safeguards will ensure 
that IHL retains its protective balance with respect to the use of cyber oper-
ations during armed conflicts. 
 
                                                                                                                      
180. On the balancing between humanitarian considerations and military necessity, see 
Michael N. Schmitt, Military Necessity and Humanity in International Humanitarian Law: Preserving 
the Delicate Balance, 50 VIRGINIA JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 795 (2010). But see Adil 
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